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I. Introduction 
Thucydides begins and ends his History of the Peloponnesian War with stasis. As early in 
his work as the so-called “Archaeology” (or Tekmeria) he shows Greek cities struggling with 
internal conflicts. Some of the final events in book eight are the Athenian stasis and the rule of 
the Four Hundred. Thucydides recounts numerous incidents of stasis throughout his work, 
highlighting the phenomenon to such a degree that some believe that he viewed the entire 
Peloponnesian War as a fundamentally internal conflict.1  
The most prominent stasis in his narrative is the Korkyrean civil war. Thucydides writes 
several chapters narrating the events of the civil war, and gives an uncharacteristic moral 
authorial commentary about the events of the stasis, where he indicates that atrocities first seen 
in Korkyra spread to the rest of Greece. He gives more attention to the Korkyrean civil war than 
to any other similar event in his work. His narrative of the Korkyrean stasis has become the 
standard Thucydidean stasis, against which all others in his work are measured. In addition, 
Thucydides immediately follows his narrative of the Korkyrean stasis with a discussion of stasis 
in the remaining years of the Peloponnesian War. 
After denouncing the Korkyrean civil war for the suffering it caused, he adds that “it 
seemed greater, because it was the first of these, while later all of Greece was also in turmoil” 
(3.82.1).2 He reinforces this claim by saying that later staseis grew worse than that of Korkyra: 
“so the affairs of the cities were divided by faction, and where it came later, it carried to 
extremes the change in thinking by awareness of earlier events” (3.82.3).3 Thucydides’ claims 
                                                
1 Most notable is Price’s book-length exploration of this idea: Price, Jonathan. Thucydides and Internal War. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
2 ἔδοξε µᾶλλον, διότι ἐν τοῖς πρώτη ἐγένετο, ἐπεὶ ὕστερόν γε καὶ πᾶν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐκινήθη. 
3 ἐστασίαζέ τε οὖν τὰ τῶν πόλεων, καὶ τὰ ἐφυστερίζοντά που πύστει τῶν προγενοµένων πολὺ ἐπέφερε τὴν 
ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ καινοῦσθαι τὰς διανοίας (3.82.3). 
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seem to suggest that while Korkyra caused truly horrific violence, later civil conflicts during the 
Peloponnesian War were even worse. 
Clearly Thucydides intended his account of the Korkyrean stasis to serve as a yardstick 
for other incidents of stasis in his work. However, analysis of the many episodes of stasis he 
includes reveals that the connection between the Korkyrean civil war and ensuing staseis is less 
certain than Thucydides claims. Korkyra is by far the most violent episode of stasis in the entire 
Peloponnesian war, and one of the longest lasting. Furthermore, several years passed between the 
Korkyrean stasis and any similar incidents of any importance.  
Thus two possibilities exist: either Thucydides exaggerated the relevance of the 
Korkyrean stasis, or he chose it as the centerpiece of his stasis narrative for other reasons. It is 
unlikely that Thucydides, an intelligent and perceptive author known for his commitment to 
seeking out the truth, would commit such an error as making a false claim for rhetorical effect. 
This paper will attempt to analyze the incidents of stasis in Thucydides’ work to gain a better 
understanding of how Thucydides understood stasis and wrote about it. 
 Thucydides could have intended several different effects for his claims in 3.82. One 
possibility is that designed the stasis narrative to parallel that of the plague that struck Athens. 
His description of the plague and its aftermath in book two is one of the few sections in his work 
where, as in the account of the Korkyrean civil war, he injects moral statements about the 
devolution of society into his narrative. In that section, he comments that he wishes to record the 
symptoms of the plague so that future readers can recognize it if it returns (2.48.3). He goes on to 
describe the physical symptoms of the plague and then comments on the wave of disorder and 
lawlessness that followed. He delivers his narrative of the Korkyrean civil war in the same style, 
which raises the possibility that he included the ‘symptoms’ of stasis for the same reason: so that 
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readers would be able to identify a stasis if they ever found themselves affected by one.4 This 
hypothesis justifies the presence of 3.82, but does not explain why Thucydides would make a 
questionable claim about the spread of stasis throughout Greece.  
 Another possibility is that Thucydides, having made his assertion that stasis grew more 
violent and more common as the war progressed, decided not to include any examples of this 
process. Necessarily, the incidents of stasis that he does include in his work would have to be 
important for some other reason, and above all for their relationship to the Peloponnesian War. 
Thucydides wove many themes into his history of the war, and stasis was an important theme.5  
 The reason for this tension between his rhetorically effective claims in recounting the 
Korkyrean stasis, and his broader narrative, which consists mostly of accurate reporting, lies in 
his main objective in writing the history of the war. Thucydides recorded the war between the 
Athenians and the Spartans because he expected it would be worthy of his efforts. The two 
combatants were at the height of their powers when the war broke out and Thucydides began his 
project. The entire Greek world had mobilized and chosen a side (1.1-3). During the 
Peloponnesian War, “sufferings were brought upon the Greeks that were not repeated in an 
equivalent period of time” (1.23.1),6 and there had never been “such an exodus and killing of 
men, some on account of war, others on account of factionalism” (1.23.2).7 Thucydides also 
mentions other catastrophes such as earthquakes, eclipses, droughts, famines, and plagues 
(1.23.3). From the beginning of his work Thucydides emphasizes the tragedy and suffering at 
                                                
4 Price, Thucydides and Internal War, 14-18. 
5 Some notable works include Barnard, Mark. “Stasis in Thucydides’ Narrative and Analysis of Factionalism in the 
Polis.” PhD diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1980; Fuks, Alexander. “Thucydides and the Stasis in 
Korkyra.” The American Journal of Philology 92, no. 1 (January 1971): 48-55; Lintott, Andrew. Violence, Civil 
Strife and Revolution in the Classical City. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982; Macleod, Colin. 
“Thucydides on Faction (3.82-3).” In Collected Essays of Colin Macleod, edited by Barbara Macleod, New York: 
Clarendon Press, 2005; Price, Jonathan. Thucydides and Internal War. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2001; Puckett, Scott. “Stasis in the Ancient Greek Historians.” PhD diss., Tulane University, 2013. 
6 παθήµατά τε ξυνηνέχθη γενέσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ τῇ Ἑλλάδι οἷα οὐχ ἕτερα ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ (1.23.1). 
7 φυγαὶ τοσαίδε ἀνθρώπων καὶ φόνος, ὁ µὲν κατ᾽ αὐτὸν τὸν πόλεµον, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν (1.23.2). 
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this time, and underscores that war and stasis were the chief agents of this suffering.8 Thucydides 
frequently shows that history can be educational, he clearly considers teaching about the 
suffering that war and stasis can cause one of the chief objectives of his work. 
 Throughout the course of his work, Thucydides mentions stasis dozens of times and 
implies it dozens more. In the majority of those instances, the victors of a stasis expel their 
enemies. Thucydides mentions that the Peloponnesian war caused both flight and death, either 
through the war itself or through stasis. In the bulk of his narrative, stasis causes flight, while war 
causes death. However, in Korkyra (and only a few later examples), factions were intent on the 
complete destruction of their opponents, not just their defeat. For this reason the stasis at 
Korkyra devolved to a state of violence unmatched throughout the entire war. Thucydides most 
probably chose Korkyra for his commentary on stasis because of this violence.  
 But the contrast between his claims of worsening violence and the extremes reached in 
Korkyra still remains. Thucydides has shown that suffering was widespread, and that stasis was a 
cause of it. All that differs is that the intensity of the damage caused by stasis seems not to have 
increased as the war progressed.  
 Throughout the course of the war, the number of staseis increased. Thucydides claims 
that awareness of earlier events led to extremes in thinking, but this awareness manifested itself 
in his narrative as an increase in the ubiquity of stasis. Thus stasis affected greater numbers of 
people as the war ran on, and successful subversive campaigns by generals like Demosthenes, 
Eurymedon, or Brasidas capitalized on the paralysis and division brought about by stasis to take 
control of enemy cities. This is where the true extremity revealed itself: the sudden ease with 
                                                
8 Rusten, Jeffrey. “Kinesis in the Preface to Thucydides.” Kinesis: The Ancient Depiction of Gesture, Motion, and 
Emotion, edited by Christina A. Clark et al. (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2015) pp. 27–40. JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.7684934.8. 
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which a stasis could develop. Thucydides suggests this in 3.82.1, but does not fully develop the 
thought or clarify his later assertion.  
 He says instead that the revolution in thinking sparked at Korkyra precipitated 
increasingly cunning attacks and more frequent attempts to seize power, as well as pushing 
people’s desire for vengeance to new heights. In reality, a large fraction of incidents of stasis that 
occur after Korkyra are the result of an army arriving outside a city and creating a divide among 
the citizens within. In situations like this, there is usually relatively little violence or treachery. 
However, in the few examples that Thucydides reports which do describe staseis that do last 
longer and are the results of plots, there is indeed a ‘revolution in thinking.’ This revolution is a 
new murderous disposition of individuals living through stasis. Before the civil war at Korkyra, 
the vast majority of staseis ended with the defeated party fleeing the city. However, after the 
democrats at Korkyra massacred their oligarchic opponents, later cities proved willing to utterly 
destroy their opponents instead of driving them out of the city. This new attitude is less visible in 
these instances because there are fewer atrocities like those at Korkyra where mobs dragged 
people from sanctuaries and killed them. The revolution in thinking that Thucydides describes 
does not cause violence to worsen objectively, it only changes peoples’ mindset so that they are 
more disposed to begin a stasis and murder their fellow citizens.  
 
II. Korkyra 
Thucydides writes at great length about the stasis at Korkyra, since it was “one of the first 
which had broken out” (3.82.1). Furthermore, Korkyra was a strategically important city in his 
work; it was involved with the dispute at Epidamnos that started the war, and it controlled one of 
the largest navies in Greece. While the Korkyrean civil war did not impact either side of the 
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Peloponnesian War directly, Korkyra’s self-destruction removed its navy from the 
Peloponnesian War, which was strategically significant. His account (3.70-3.84) describes the 
origins of the conflict, provides a summary of the important events, and examines the internal 
features of stasis. In the main body of the narrative (3.70-3.81), Thucydides outlines the course 
of the civil war up to the arrival of an Athenian fleet led by Eurymedon. His conclusion (3.82-
3.84) analyzes the behavior of the Korkyreans and describes how stasis spread to the rest of 
Greece, “with rival efforts everywhere by the leaders of the people to bring in the Athenians, and 
the oligarchs, the Spartans” (3.82.1).9 He adds that these leaders are not motivated by genuine 
desire for reform, only greed: “for in the cities the leaders, each with attractive slogans, the 
commons with equal politics and the aristocrats with the rule of the wise, made the commons 
their prizes, cherishing them in words only” (3.82.8).10 
Most of Thucydides’ claims in 3.82-3.84 are drawn from his account of the civil war. 
Thus his conclusion serves the important function of connecting his analysis of people’s 
behavior to actual events.  
The stasis at Korkyra resulted from a conspiracy. After the naval battle over Epidamnos, 
the Corinthians suborned about 250 of their Korkyrean prisoners, and persuaded them to hand 
over their home city to Corinth (3.70.1).11 Upon their release and return to Korkyra, these 
conspirators brought Peithias, a self-proclaimed proxenos12 for Athens, to trial, accusing him of 
enslaving Korkyra to the Athenians. Their attack failed, and he successfully countersued five of 
them for religious violations (3.70.4).  
                                                
9  διαφορῶν οὐσῶν ἑκασταχοῦ τοῖς τε τῶν δήµων προστάταις τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπάγεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις τοὺς 
Λακεδαιµονίους (3.82.1) 
10 οἱ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι προστάντες µετὰ ὀνόµατος ἑκάτεροι εὐπρεποῦς, πλήθους τε ἰσονοµίας πολιτικῆς καὶ 
ἀριστοκρατίας σώφρονος προτιµήσει, τὰ µὲν κοινὰ λόγῳ θεραπεύοντες ἆθλα ἐποιοῦντο (3.82.8). 
11 Cartwright, David. A Historical Commentary on Thucydides: A Companion to Rex Warner’s Penguin Translation 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), ad loc. (p. 155). 
12 ἐθελοπρόξενός (3.70.3). 
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 The conspirators broke into the Korkyrean assembly, killed Peithias and sixty others, and 
seized power (3.70.6).13 A Corinthian trireme with Spartan ambassadors soon arrived at the city, 
and the conspirators, emboldened by their presence, attacked their democratic opponents and 
defeated them (3.72.2).  
The next day the fighting continued, and both sides attempted to gain allies by offering 
slaves their freedom in return for their loyalty.14 Most slaves sided with the democrats, while the 
oligarchic conspirators hired mercenaries (3.73). 
 A few days later, the violence resumed. This time the democrats were victorious. 
Thucydides reports that in the fighting women attacked their enemies by throwing tiles from 
their rooftops (3.74.1). Stunned by this defeat and fearing a counterattack, the oligarchs set fire 
to the people’s houses, hoping to delay their advance.15 The resulting fire destroyed much of the 
city (3.74.2). The Corinthian ship, meanwhile, had sailed away upon learning of the oligarchs’ 
defeat (3.74.3).  
 The next day the Athenian general Nikostratos arrived from Naupaktos with twelve ships 
and reinforcements. He calmed the city and arranged a truce between the democrats and 
oligarchs and proposed an offensive and defensive alliance with Athens (3.75.1).16 He then 
prepared to sail away. The leaders of the people convinced him that the city still needed 
                                                
13 Gomme, A. W. A Historical Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford University Press, 1956), III.70.6 (p. 361) points 
out that the entire oligarchic faction must have attacked the assembly. 
14 Korkyra was one of the few cities to use large numbers of slaves for agriculture, and in some cases as rowers in 
their warships (Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, III. 73 (p. 362-3)). 
15 Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, III.74.2 (p.363) remarks that burning the houses would have 
made the lines of attack on the oligarch’s position more open and accessible, and reasons that the oligarchs started 
the fire in response to an actual attack, not out of fear of the possibility of one. 
16 David Cartwright believes that this alliance was concluded at this time (Cartwright, David. A Historical 
Commentary on Thucydides, III.75 (p.156)), and Athens’ aid to Korkyra when the Peloponnesian fleet arrived 
supports this view, but Thucydides says in 3.80 that the Athenians sent their fleet as the revolution broke out, not 
after Nikostratos concluded the alliance: ἑξήκοντα νῆες Ἀθηναίων προσπλέουσαι ἀπὸ Λευκάδος: ἃς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι 
πυνθανόµενοι τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὰς µετ᾽ Ἀλκίδου ναῦς ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν µελλούσας πλεῖν ἀπέστειλαν (3.80.2). 
Furthermore, Athens and Korkyra already had a defensive alliance (1.44.1, Gomme (1956) III.70.2, (p.360)). 
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assistance, and asked him to leave five of his ships at Korkyra, while they would man five ships 
of their own and send them with him (3.75.2). He agreed, and the democrats began to draft the 
oligarchs to serve on the ships leaving the city. The oligarchs, detecting the plot, took refuge in a 
temple (3.75.3). 
 The democrats rearmed themselves and tried to attack the suppliant oligarchs, but 
Nikostratos stopped them. (3.75.4). The rest of the oligarchs feared for their safety and went to 
the temple of Hera, but the democrats ferried them to an island where they would be safe and 
could do no harm with a plot of their own (3.75.5). 
 A week later a Peloponnesian fleet carrying the Spartan generals Alkidas and Brasidas 
arrived at the Korkyrean harbor (3.76). The democrats brought the oligarchs back from the 
island, ignored Athenian tactical advice and put up a feeble resistance (3.77). They were defeated 
(3.79.1), but the Peloponnesians had little interest in plundering Korkyra itself and instead laid 
waste to the mainland (3.79.3). 
 Soon after Korkyra received word that an Athenian fleet of sixty ships under the 
command of Eurymedon was approaching, sent to reinforce the democrats in the city against the 
Peloponnesian fleet of Alkidas, which immediately fled (3.80.2). Again emboldened by the 
support of their allies, the democrats attacked the oligarchs. They killed many who were just 
disembarking their ships. They convinced fifty of the oligarchs hiding in the Temple of Hera to 
stand trial, and executed them all (3.81.2). The others still in the temple killed themselves to 
avoid a similar fate. Thucydides emphasizes the fact that these deaths occurred on sacred ground 
(3.81.3). Eurymedon and his fleet stayed for seven days, during which the Korkyrean democrats 
murdered every oligarch they could find. Thucydides adds that some were killed over personal 
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grudges or private debts (3.81.4).17 The violence reached horrific levels: “for a father killed even 
his son and suppliants were both ripped from sanctuaries and killed right there” (3.81.5).18 
Those oligarchs who managed to escape first took refuge on the mainland and seized 
forts there. From there they launched raids on Korkyra, and caused a severe famine by 
destroying crops (3.85.2). The oligarchs asked Sparta and Corinth for help retaking the city, but 
were ignored. Eventually, they crossed back over to the island and fortified themselves on Mt. 
Istone, from which they raided the countryside (4.2.3). This state of affairs continued until after 
the battle at Sphacteria in 425 BCE.  
The Athenians Eurymedon—who had been at Korkyra during the most violent part of the 
civil war— and Sophokles sailed to Korkyra and assisted their democratic allies. The oligarchs 
had based themselves on Mt. Istone and had been waging war on the countryside with great 
success (4.46.1). The Athenians and the Korkyrean democrats attacked the oligarchs and 
captured their fort. The oligarchs surrendered on very specific terms: they would lay down their 
arms only if the Athenians, not other Korkyreans, decided their fate (4.46.2). Eurymedon and 
Sophokles took their prisoners to an island, where they would be kept until transport to Athens 
could be arranged. They were given a kind of parole, with the agreement that if any of them tried 
to escape, all of them would be punished (4.46.3). The Korkyrean democrats felt that Athenian 
justice would be too soft, and developed a plot to have the prisoners killed. The democrats sent 
agents to the oligarchs on the island, warning them that the Athenian generals planned to execute 
them all, and that their only hope for survival was to escape (4.46.5). Sure enough, some tried to 
escape, were captured, and the Athenian generals handed all the oligarchs over to the democrats 
                                                
17 Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, III.81.4 (p.369) believes that charges of conspiracy were used 
as pretexts for these murders, and I agree. The change in morals only affects virtues related to party affiliation, and 
killing for private purposes would still be considered reprehensible unless it were given the disguise of factional 
conflict. 
18 καὶ γὰρ πατὴρ παῖδα ἀπέκτεινε καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἱερῶν ἀπεσπῶντο καὶ πρὸς αὐτοῖς ἐκτείνοντο (3.81.5). 
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(4.47.1). The democrats put the oligarchs in a single building and killed them all with spears, 
arrows, and roof tiles (4.48). The democrats then went to Mt. Istone and enslaved all the women 
in the oligarchs’ fort. 
 Thucydides declares that “in this way the Korkyreans from the mountain were destroyed 
by the people, and the civil war, having lasted so long, ended at this point” (4.48.5).19 
Thucydides does not make this point, but the civil war ended in the same way that it had begun, 
with deceit. The democratic ploy to trick the oligarchs into causing their own destruction is much 
the same as earlier stratagems employed during the main conflict in 427 BCE. 
In 3.82, Thucydides describes how stasis spread to the rest of the Greek world: “after 
that, virtually all of Greece was in turmoil, with opposite efforts everywhere by the democrats to 
bring in the Athenians and the oligarchs the Lacedaimonians” (3.82.1).20 War, he adds, provided 
rival factions with the ability to easily call for external allies who could oust their opponents 
(3.82.1).   He comments that “many difficulties fell upon the cities in stasis, things occurring as 
they always will occur, as long as the nature of man is the same, greater or lesser and changing in 
appearances, as the changes of every incident dictate” (3.82.2).21 However, he says that the 
difficulties occurring after Korkyra were greater, not lesser. He adds that “the affairs of the cities 
were in stasis, and where it came later with those coming before as an example, it bore to 
extremes the change in thinking with regard to the cunning of attacks and the extraordinary 
nature of retribution” (3.82.3).22 
                                                
19 τοιούτῳ µὲν τρόπῳ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ ὄρους Κερκυραῖοι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήµου διεφθάρησαν, καὶ ἡ στάσις πολλὴ γενοµένη 
ἐτελεύτησεν ἐς τοῦτο (4.48.5). 
20 ἐπεὶ ὕστερόν γε καὶ πᾶν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐκινήθη, διαφορῶν οὐσῶν ἑκασταχοῦ τοῖς τε τῶν δήµων 
προστάταις τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπάγεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις τοὺς Λακεδαιµονίους (3.82.1). 
21 καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεσι, γιγνόµενα µὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόµενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις 
ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, µᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαίτερα καὶ τοῖς εἴδεσι διηλλαγµένα, ὡς ἂν ἕκασται αἱ µεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντυχιῶν 
ἐφιστῶνται (3.82.2). 
22 ἐστασίαζέ τε οὖν τὰ τῶν πόλεων, καὶ τὰ ἐφυστερίζοντά που πύστει τῶν προγενοµένων πολὺ ἐπέφερε τὴν 
ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ καινοῦσθαι τὰς διανοίας τῶν τ᾽ ἐπιχειρήσεων περιτεχνήσει καὶ τῶν τιµωριῶν ἀτοπίᾳ (3.82.3). 
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Next he begins to describe the internal features of stasis that affect the Greek cities after 
the civil war at Korkyra. The description of these internal features is very similar to Thucydides’ 
earlier description of the plague symptoms, both in terminology and included details.23 Stasis, he 
says, upends the normal moral values of a city in two ways. First, the names for certain behaviors 
change: “reckless daring was named the courage of a friend, forward looking hesitation was 
gilded cowardice, wisdom was a cover for a lack of manliness, and anything for the sake of 
prudence was inaction. Incredible aggression was the lot of a man, and to plot for a safeguard 
against misfortune was a reasonable way of turning away [danger]” (3.82.4).24 This change in 
values is not represented in the events of Korkyra, since there is very little discussion of 
individuals involved in the fighting. It is easy to imagine these distorted virtues being valued in 
the midst of a violent civil war. 
Secondly, Thucydides describes types of actions that became common or acceptable in 
cities filled by stasis. Almost every one of the actions has a corresponding example in his earlier 
narrative of the Korkyrean stasis. For instance, Thucydides says that party relationships were 
more important than family ties—in his earlier narrative he described fathers killing their own 
sons. Again, he says that, “if any oaths of truce were made…they only had authority when there 
was no other advantage to be had” (3.82.7).25 The earlier narrative described several occasions 
where the democrats broke their truces with the oligarchs and attacked them, notably when they 
tried to enlist their opponents on Nikostratos’ ships (3.75.2) and then later killed them when they 
got off their ships (3.81.2). He says that “plotting any action was admirable, and suspicion of a 
                                                
23 Price, Thucydides and Internal War, p. 15. 
24 τόλµα µὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνοµίσθη, µέλλησις δὲ προµηθὴς δειλία εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον 
τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχηµα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνετὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀργόν· τὸ δ᾽ ἐµπλήκτως ὀξὺ ἀνδρὸς µοίρᾳ προσετέθη, 
ἀσφαλείᾳ δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὔλογος (3.82.4). 
25 καὶ ὅρκοι εἴ που ἄρα γένοιντο ξυναλλαγῆς…διδόµενοι ἴσχυον οὐκ ἐχόντων ἄλλοθεν δύναµιν (3.82.7). 
 12 
plot was even cleverer” (3.82.5),26 which harkens back to the oligarch’s suspicions (later proved 
correct) that the democrats’ plans to send five of their ships with Nicostratus were a ploy to 
dispose of their enemies. Both sides in the civil war were constantly suspicious of the other’s 
intentions. After that plot, the democrats feared retaliation from the oligarchs and sent four 
hundred of them who were suppliants in the temple of Hera to an island (3.74.5). 
In addition, “to avenge oneself on someone was of greater importance than to not have 
been harmed in the first place” (3.82.7).27 While the entirety of the Korkyrean civil war was 
filled with preemptive strikes, one notable example is when the oligarchs set fire to the center of 
the city, burning down not only their enemies’ houses but their own as well (3.74.2). This attack 
risked the complete destruction of the city just to prevent the democrats from attacking the 
oligarchs. 
A considerable number of points made in sections of authorial commentary on the 
Korkyrean stasis reflect back to the narrative of that conflict. But Thucydides also describes 
some events in the commentary that are not paralleled by the events at Korkyra. Most of these 
are descriptions of the tragic unraveling of Greek society. Thucydides reports that there is a 
complete disappearance of trust (3.83.1) and that everyone focused on self-defense (3.83.2). The 
stupid usually killed the intelligent, since they feared being outsmarted and launched preemptive 
attacks (3.83.3). Religion completely lost its ability to manage public behavior (3.82.8), but both 
parties used lofty rhetoric to justify atrocities (3.82.8). Worst of all, the moderates in the cities 
were killed for refusing to choose sides and trying to escape the violence (3.82.8). This kind of 
fanaticism was almost unheard of.   
                                                
26 ἐπιβουλεύσας δέ τις τυχὼν ξυνετὸς καὶ ὑπονοήσας ἔτι δεινότερος (3.82.5). 
27 ἀντιτιµωρήσασθαί τέ τινα περὶ πλείονος ἦν ἢ αὐτὸν µὴ προπαθεῖν (3.82.7). 
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It is important to note that these moral comments are describing stasis in Greece, not in 
Korkyra alone. But Thucydides describes actions that are clearly related to those at Korkyra. 
This has the effect of tying the events of the Korkyrean civil war to those that occurred later. 
Unfortunately, Thucydides does not go into greater detail about other incidents of stasis in the 
rest of his work, so these internal features are not helpful for identifying stasis where Thucydides 
does not use the word itself. Thucydides attributes the savagery of the stasis to the war, a 
“violent teacher” (3.82.2)28 that “matches peoples’ minds to their circumstances” (3.82.2).29 
Because of the war, the Greek cities suffered many tragedies such as those Thucydides has 
delineated in his account of the Korkyrean stasis. The cause of these tragedies was a lust for 
power “on account of greed and ambition” (3.82.8).30  
In this section, Thucydides has clearly laid out the environment in which stasis appeared 
throughout Greece. The Peloponnesian War enabled factions to call for external support to defeat 
their enemies. Some external allies, like Brasidas, were moderate. Others, like Eurymedon, were 
much more bloodthirsty. People embroiled in a stasis changed their evaluation of behavior, 
prizing aggression and deceit instead of nobility and wisdom. And most importantly, awareness 
of the stasis at Korkyra persuaded factions of the viability of stasis as a means to seize power, 
and changed their disposition, so that they were even more creative in their ways to divide their 
cities and even more extreme in their vengeance against their opponents. Thucydides has called 
war a “violent teacher” (3.82.2). This section has shown exactly how violent a teacher war can 
be. The usefulness of Thucydides’ work lies in its ability to relate the same lessons as war itself 
                                                
28 βίαιος διδάσκαλος (3.82.2). 
29 πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁµοιοῖ (ibid.). 
30  διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιµίαν (3.82.8). 
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can, without the suffering. The next section will examine the other examples of stasis in 
Thucydides’ work to compare them with the Korkyrean stasis and Thucydides’ own comments.  
 
III. Pre-Korkyrean Stasis 
Thucydides writes about stasis throughout his entire work; however, his use of the term is 
inconsistent. There are instances where he uses the term stasis—whether the noun στάσις or a 
form of the verb στασιάζω—to refer to civil wars and others where he describes coups and less 
bloody conflicts. In other passages he does not use the word stasis at all, despite referring to 
events that clearly constitute a stasis. Usually in these circumstances, the existence of stasis is 
less important than some other aspect of the event, so it receives a different name (for example, a 
revolution that resulted from stasis might be called a revolution, since the revolt is more 
important than the internal divisions). There are certain characteristics that unify his idea of 
stasis throughout his work,31 but largely these characteristics are derived from his famous 
passage in book three describing the stasis at Korkyra. One unifying theme across his work is 
that all these staseis are caused by greed and personal ambition. Another common feature is that 
cities in stasis are paralyzed and suffering. 
This chapter separates Thucydides’ accounts of stasis into those that occur in the context 
of Korkyra and those that do not. Most of the staseis that Thucydides describes are influenced in 
various ways by the Peloponnesian war, but some are not. The incidents of stasis that occur 
during the war can be further divided into several categories. Some are coups or revolutions, 
others are prolonged civil wars, while still others are the result of conspiracies. Others occur as 
                                                
31 Price, “Thucydides and Internal War,” includes the transvaluation of words (p.39), a lapse between words and 
actions (p. 45), the disappearance of intelligence (p.50), and a decline in morality (p. 57). I am skeptical, as 
Thucydides does not include enough details about many incidents of stasis in his narrative. I think Price is guilty of 
believing Korkyra is exactly representative of every incident of stasis. 
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the result of external influence that heightens or creates internal divisions. Some incidents of 
stasis unite a combination of these factors.  
Earlier staseis, unrelated to the Peloponnesian war, in some ways still align with 
Thucydides’ Korkyrean model; they are caused by greed and personal ambition and they 
frequently divide a polis into two factions based on wealth or power (although not necessarily 
with specific reference to the terms oligarchs or democrats). In other respects, each is unique. 
Different incidents have internal or external origins, and the degree of violence is usually far less 
than that of Korkyra. Analysis of these pre-Korkyrean staseis reveals that Thucydides described 
these incidents in different terms than he did their later counterparts related to the Peloponnesian 
war. Pre-Korkyrean staseis were, like Korkyra, fought over power and influence, but without the 
context of a democratic-oligarchic divide. Thus, parties in these conflicts were not united by the 
same principles as later factions.  
Analysis of Thucydides’ descriptions of these incidents provides a historical backdrop 
against which to compare his later Korkyrean model of stasis, which he says engulfed the Greek 
world during the Peloponnesian War. 
  
Prehistoric Stasis in Attica 
Thucydides shows that stasis affects Greece throughout the entire course of its history; 
his first mention of the phenomenon occurs in the Archaeology, where he explains that, “on 
account of the excellence of the land, the power (δυνάµις) of some was becoming greater, which 
brought about factional strife (στάσεις)” (1.2.4).32  This factionalism led to the growth of Athens, 
                                                
32 διὰ γὰρ ἀρετὴν γῆς αἵ τε δυνάµεις τισὶ µείζους ἐγγιγνόµεναι στάσεις ἐνεποίουν (1.2.4). 
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since Attic soil was too poor for anyone to bother fighting over it.33 As a result, “the most 
powerful having fallen out of the rest of Greece on account of war or factionalism (στάσει) 
withdrew to Athens as a safe place” (1.2.6).34 This brief description of a land torn apart by stasis 
is much less detailed than the lengthy passage describing the dangers of stasis in book three. 
Nevertheless, Thucydides leaves a few clues about these early conflicts.  
The differing quality of various plots of land in a settlement caused some individuals to 
be richer than others as their harvests were consistently more valuable. Greater wealth meant 
greater power. Power is a parallel theme in the Korkyrean civil war, which was fought—
according to Thucydides’ analysis in 3.82—because of “desire for power (ἀρχή) on account of 
greediness and love of honor” (3.82.8).35  
Individuals in these early staseis fought over more nebulous ideas of power and influence 
than their later counterparts; at the same time, they fought for more tangible objectives. When 
quality land meant wealth and power, there were always those willing to take it by force. Later, 
in Korkyra, power and rule were not explicitly tied to particular pieces of land, but rather there 
existed systems of government that empowered different groups of people. Later, the democrats 
at Korkyra were not attacking the rich to seize their property, but to destroy the threat to popular 
control of the government. Economic motivation did drive some of the violence—Thucydides 
says some debtors killed their creditors (3.81.4)—but politics was the main cause. 36 
                                                
33 Cartwright, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, I.2 (pp. 12-13) points out that this point relies on 
Thucydides’ previous argument that prehistoric stasis was caused by the quality of various plots of land, which is 
not drawn from archaeological evidence but his own experiences in the 5th century BCE. I disagree, cf. Hornblower, 
Simon. A Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), I.4 (pp. 11-12). 
34 ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος οἱ πολέµῳ ἢ στάσει ἐκπίπτοντες παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίους οἱ δυνατώτατοι ὡς βέβαιον ὂν 
ἀνεχώρουν (1.2.6). 
35 ἀρχὴ ἡ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιµίαν (3.82.8). 
36 Fuks, Alexander. “Thucydides and the Stasis in Korkyra.” The American Journal of Philology 92, no. 1 (January 
1971): pp. 49-51. 
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 Surely Thucydides intends this passage to be evidence supporting his later assertion that 
stasis will bring violence “as long as the nature of man is the same” (3.82.2).37  However, there 
are several aspects of this passage that distinguish early staseis from later ones. In early staseis, 
the objective of each party was possession of valuable property. In the Korkyrean stasis, the 
objective of each party was the destruction of the other. Throughout 3.82, Thucydides shows that 
there were no real truces or agreements, no mercy for enemies, and no willingness to have 
meaningful negotiations.  
 Another possible interpretation of these disparities is that Thucydides, unaware of the real 
circumstances of prehistoric staseis, allows an anachronism, forcing his own understanding of 
the phenomenon onto those in the past. However, a more plausible interpretation is that 
Thucydides incorporated stasis into his narrative of the Archaeology to introduce the 
phenomenon that would be so widespread during his history.38 This suits his own view that 
history repeats itself.  
While Thucydides does not include similar details in 1.2, the information that he does 
include—that they were fought over the more fertile plots of land—indicates that combatants 
would have been more concerned with obtaining their enemies’ possessions than killing them. In 
addition, Thucydides mentions in 1.2.6 that Athens became a safe haven for refugees from the 
rest of Greece, which was constantly in turmoil because of these staseis. This brief statement 
reveals that in these early land conflicts, there were large numbers of survivors; enough that they 
“increased the previously large polity to such a multitude of persons in the city that finally there 
was not sufficient space in Attica and they sent colonies to Ionia” (1.2.6).39  
                                                
37 ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ (3.82.2). 
38 Hornblower, Simon. A Commentary on Thucydides, I.4 (pp. 11-12). 
39 καὶ πολῖται γιγνόµενοι εὐθὺς ἀπὸ παλαιοῦ µείζω ἔτι ἐποίησαν πλήθει ἀνθρώπων τὴν πόλιν, ὥστε καὶ ἐς Ἰωνίαν 
ὕστερον ὡς οὐχ ἱκανῆς οὔσης τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀποικίας ἐξέπεµψαν (1.2.6). 
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While this example does not necessarily show a change in human nature, it does suggest 
that different circumstances have a large influence on the course of events in a stasis. 
 
Prehistoric Stasis because of the Trojan War                                                                 
Thucydides reinforces this concept when he describes another period of mass stasis in Greece. In 
1.12, he describes how “the late return of the Hellenes from Ilium brought many revolutions, and 
civil strife (στάσεις) arose in many of the cities” (1.12.2).40                                       
 Again, these conflicts were fought over land. The Greek soldiers who fought at Troy 
were away from home for over a decade; their lands either fell into disuse or were tended by 
others who surely felt they had some legal claim to them. The delayed return of these soldiers 
must have caused a great deal of conflict as they tried to reassert their claims to property now 
held by others who had worked it for years. The winners of these primary conflicts kept their 
land, while the losers were driven away: “those people having fallen out of these [conflicts] 
founded the cities” (1.12.2).41 
However, these refugees started a secondary wave of conflicts, as they started land 
disputes elsewhere. Thucydides gives two examples. He says that “Sixty years after the capture 
of Troy the modern Boeotians were driven out of Arne by the Thessalians” (1.12.3)42, and that 
“in the eightieth year after [Troy] the Dorians and the Heraclids became masters of the 
Peloponnese” (1.12.3).43 
                                                
40 ἥ τε γὰρ ἀναχώρησις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐξ Ἰλίου χρονία γενοµένη πολλὰ ἐνεόχµωσε, καὶ στάσεις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὡς 
ἐπὶ πολὺ ἐγίγνοντο (1.12.2).  
41 ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἐκπίπτοντες τὰς πόλεις ἔκτιζον (1.12.2). 
42 Βοιωτοί τε γὰρ οἱ νῦν ἑξηκοστῷ ἔτει µετὰ Ἰλίου ἅλωσιν ἐξ Ἄρνης ἀναστάντες ὑπὸ Θεσσαλῶν (1.12.3). 
43 Δωριῆς τε ὀγδοηκοστῷ ἔτει ξὺν Ἡρακλείδαις Πελοπόννησον ἔσχον (ibid.). Hornblower, A Commentary on 
Thucydides, I.12.2 (p. 37) thinks stasis is an inappropriate term for these conflicts, but I disagree. There is a violent 
internal struggle over power, which matches all other incidents of stasis in Thucydides’ work.  
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This passage is particularly relevant to the civil war at Korkyra because it not only 
describes a period of widespread stasis—albeit focused on land disputes—but also is related to a 
larger conflict, the Trojan War. Nevertheless, this wave of staseis is more closely related to 
earlier land disputes than the civil wars in Greece following that in Korkyra. The wartime 
context shared by both cases is less relevant than it first seems; in the Korkyrean wave of staseis, 
the presence of an ongoing war gave both parties the opportunity for outside alliances and 
assistance, as well as dividing the population of each polis into two distinct factions which 
supported each side. While the Trojan War may have served as a “violent teacher,” making 
individuals more willing to use violence to solve disputes, the fact remains that these conflicts 
were fought over land, which means that violence of the type that pervaded Korkyra was likely 
uncommon. The subsequent conflicts caused by large numbers of refugees throughout Greece 
prove that these staseis were not as murderous as those Thucydides describes in 3.82.  
 
Prehistoric Stasis in Sparta 
 Later in the Archaeology Thucydides describes a stasis that differs from his first two 
examples. He claims that Lacedaemon “had nevertheless been divided by faction (στασιάσασα) 
for the longest time known” (1.18.1)44 even though it “had good laws since very ancient times 
and was always free from tyranny” (1.18.1).45 Whereas Thucydides previously used stasis to 
signify a violent land conflict that resulted in a winner keeping his choice of fertile land and a 
loser fleeing the area, this passage uses the term to signify a mere lack of unity in the Spartan 
state. 
                                                
44 ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ὧν ἴσµεν χρόνον στασιάσασα ὅµως ἐκ παλαιτάτου (1.18.1).  Hornblower, A Commentary on 
Thucydides, I.18.1 (p.52) takes στασιάσασα to mean ‘unsettled’ in contrast with Sparta’s later state of good order 
(cp. ηὐνοµήθη). The phrases ὅµως ἐκ παλαιτάτου and ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ὧν ἴσµεν χρόνον convince me that Sparta was 
somehow characterized by both eunomia and stasis (ηὐνοµήθη, στασιάσασα) simultaneously. 
45 ηὐνοµήθη καὶ αἰεὶ ἀτυράννευτος ἦν (ibid.). 
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 The obvious example of factions in Sparta is the division between the Spartiates, the 
Perioikoi, and the helots. The subjugation of the helots was the most violent division in society, 
but also the youngest. The Spartiates and the helots were most similar to the oligarchs and 
democrats of the Korkyrean civil war, and the violence used to keep the helots enslaved 
resembles that between the two Korkyrean factions. However, the First Messenian War, which 
resulted in the enslavement of the Messenians, took place in the second half of the 8th century 
BCE. The divisions he refers to might be even older, hence his use of παλαιτάτου (1.18.1), the 
superlative form meaning ‘very ancient.’ 
 Thucydides might also be referring to a division between the Spartiate Homoioi and the 
Perioikoi, which dated back to the legendary reforms of Lycurgus. According to legend, 
Lycurgus established the Spartan constitution in the early years of the 8th century BCE; however, 
most likely these reforms gradually developed over the centuries after the Dorians populated the 
Peloponnese.46 That Thucydides clearly considers this division within Spartan society worthy of 
the term ‘stasis’ is a notable decision, since Sparta does not share several of the main 
characteristics of stasis that he mentioned earlier. In 1.2 he notes that constantly shifting 
populations and conflicts over land prevented any “working in common” (1.3.1).47 In 1.12 he 
describes how the years of stasis and conflict prevented any sort of stability or expansion 
(1.12.1), and how only after the population had settled and there were no staseis disrupting 
society could cities begin to send out colonies to Italy, Sicily, and the rest of Greece (1.12.4). 
Later in 1.18 he says that although Sparta was constantly in stasis from its founding to the 
                                                
46 A final possibility is the division between the two Spartan kings from different branches of the royal family. 
47 κοινῇ ἐργασαµένη (1.3.1). 
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beginning of the Peloponnesian war, “on account of this [system of government] it has been 
strong enough to influence even affairs in the other cities” (1.18.1).48 
 Previously, Thucydides has shown that stasis has a paralyzing effect on a city; he will 
emphasize this theme throughout his work by showing numerous cities prevented from acting by 
internal conflict. But in this passage he shows that a good government can neutralize this effect.  
 The Spartan form of stasis is clearly distinct from not only the Korkyrean civil war, but 
also many other staseis that occurred in Greece. The factions it refers to are mostly nonviolent 
and have no effect on the city’s external effectiveness. 
Kylonian Stasis 
 Thucydides mentions another ancient stasis occurring after the Kylonian conspiracy, 
where Kylon attempted to seize control of Athens and become a tyrant. Before even the Persian 
wars, the Spartans “ordered the Athenians to drive out the curse of the goddess” (1.126.2).49 This 
curse was caused by the killing of a group of Kylon’s followers who had taken refuge in a 
sanctuary in ca. 625 BCE.50 The accursed men who had killed the suppliants were driven out of 
Athens by Kleomenes and “Athenian faction members (στασιαζόντων)” (1.126.12).51 This 
episode reveals little about Thucydides’ views of stasis, but it is worth noting as it involves 
cooperation between Spartan forces and an Athenian faction, and resulted in the vanquished 
being driven from the city. 
 
 
                                                
48 δι᾽ αὐτὸ δυνάµενοι καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι καθίστασαν (1.18.1). 
49 οἱ Λακεδαιµόνιοι ἐκέλευον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὸ ἄγος ἐλαύνειν τῆς θεοῦ (1.126.12). 
50 Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides, ad loc. (p. 210). For more information about Thucydides’ treatment 
of the Cylonian conspiracy, see Rood, Tim. “The Cylon Conspiracy: Thucydides and Uses of the Past.” 
In Thucydides Between History and Literature, edited by Antonis Tsakmakis and Melina Tamiolaki, 119-38. 
Boston: De Gruyter, 2013. 
51 µετὰ Ἀθηναίων στασιαζόντων (1.126.2). 
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Kolophonian Stasis 
In book three Thucydides describes another pre-Korkyrean stasis, this time in Kolophon 
in 430 BCE.52 Paches, an Athenian officer, was sailing up the coast when he put in at Notion, 
where Thucydides says “the Kolophonians settled, the heights of the city [Kolophon] having 
been taken by Itamenes and by barbarians who had been brought in during a private stasis 
(στάσιν)” (3.34.1).53 
Kolophon was located on the Ionian coast, where influence from the Persian Empire was 
inevitable. The Kolophonian stasis took place not between pro-Spartan and pro-Athenian parties, 
but between pro-Persian individuals Thucydides calls ‘medizers’ (3.34.2) and the rest of the 
populace. These medizers, desiring power, invited the Itamenes, a Persian,54 into the city, which 
he swiftly seized.  
 By the time Paches arrived at Notion, where refugees from Kolophon had set up a new 
government, this city too was in stasis. The causes of this stasis are less clear, but Thucydides 
notes that members of one party “bringing in mercenaries from both Arcadia and from 
Pissouthnes [a Persian Satrap], were in a fortified place” (3.34.2).55 Furthermore, “medizers from 
the heights of the city of the Kolophonians, joining them, set up a government” (3.34.2.).56 The 
opponents of this group, fleeing a second time from this new government, called in Paches 
(ibid.), who was able to restore Notion to pro-Grecian Kolophonians.  
 Similar to events at Korkyra, the stasis in Notion brought treachery and a decline in moral 
standards. Once called in to aid the pro-Greek faction, Paches “having called forth to a parley 
                                                
52 Cartwright, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, III.34 (p.141). 
53  κατῴκηντο Κολοφώνιοι τῆς ἄνω πόλεως ἑαλωκυίας ὑπὸ Ἰταµάνους καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων κατὰ στάσιν ἰδίαν 
ἐπαχθέντων (3.34.1). Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, ad loc. (p.296), has ἰδίαι.  
54 Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides, ad loc., pp. 415-416. 
55  οἱ µὲν παρὰ Πισσούθνου ἐπικούρους Ἀρκάδων τε καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐπαγαγόµενοι ἐν διατειχίσµατι εἶχον 
(3.34.2). 
56  καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἄνω πόλεως Κολοφωνίων οἱ µηδίσαντες ξυνεσελθόντες ἐπολίτευον (ibid.). 
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Hippias, [who was] holding power in the Arcadian fort, on the understanding that he would let 
him return safe and sound if he disliked his proposals” (3.34.3),57 instead imprisoned him and 
attacked the fort, killing the Arcadians. He executed Hippias and restored Notion to the 
Kolophonians, expelling the pro-Persian faction.  
 Since Paches killed pro-Persian Greeks, his actions brought less moral outrage than the 
comparatively intrafamilial violence in Korkyra. Thucydides apparently thinks little of this 
conflict, a remnant of the Persian wars in the early years of the Peloponnesian War. The 
treacherous style of fighting resembles that at Korkyra, but on the whole the conflict has 
different origins. The Persians created the external pressure necessary for stasis, and the factions 
in Kolophon and Notion were not fighting for the destruction of their enemies, but were content 
to drive them from the city in their fight for power.58 It was Athens that caused the deaths of 
enemy faction. The situation deteriorated until external support in the form of an Athenian army 
concluded the violence.  
 
Stasis in Plataea and Thebes 
 In the Plataean debate, Thucydides refers back to earlier times of stasis during the Persian 
wars and the Pentekontaetia. He has the speakers at this debate reveal details about how foreign 
influence can cause stasis. The Thebans, arguing against the Plataeans on trial with the Spartans, 
mention the phenomenon both directly and indirectly. They castigate the Plataeans for claiming 
“they alone of the Boiotians did not medize” (3.62.1)59 during the Persian Wars when they were 
                                                
57 ὁ δὲ προκαλεσάµενος ἐς λόγους Ἱππίαν τῶν ἐν τῷ διατειχίσµατι Ἀρκάδων ἄρχοντα, ὥστε, ἢν µηδὲν ἀρέσκον 
λέγῃ, πάλιν αὐτὸν καταστήσειν ἐς τὸ τεῖχος σῶν καὶ ὑγιᾶ (3.34.3). 
58 Hornblower notes that Aristotle saw this stasis as a purely internal conflict (Politics, 1313b10), but believes that 
the violence was driven by external influence (Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides, ad loc. (p 416). I agree. 
59  µόνοι Βοιωτῶν οὐ µηδίσαι (3.62.1). Colin Macleod notes that this is incorrect, the Thespians also did not medize 
(Macleod, Colin. “Thucydides’ Plataean Debate.” In Collected Essays of Colin Macleod, edited by Barbara 
Macleod, New York: Clarendon Press, 2005, p. 106). 
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the “only Boiotians that atticized” (3.62.2)60 when the Athenians attacked only recently. As 
Thucydides has shown, medizing or atticizing can be understood as an act of stasis. Different 
groups in a city have more or less to lose by allowing an enemy army to enter. When the 
Thebans accuse the Plataeans of ‘atticizing,’ they mean that the Athenian faction within the city 
was able to exert enough influence over the government to ensure the city sided with Athens. 
Thucydides gives no further details about this process, so any events in Plataea during the 
Persian wars are not useful in analyzing Thucydides’ characterization of stasis in his work.  
 However, the Thebans describe how their “city being governed at that time happened to 
be governed neither by an oligarchy with equal rights nor by a democracy” (3.62.3)61 but instead 
“a narrow oligarchy (δυναστεία) of a few men held power” (3.62.3).62 These few, they continue, 
“expecting that their private power might be greater if the Persian were victorious, holding the 
masses by force they brought him [the Persian] in” (3.62.4).63 Thucydides does not use the word 
‘stasis,’ but there are two factors that make this episode part of his stasis model.  
First, he describes a conflict that exactly resembles other staseis he has related. The 
arrival of the Persian army deepened divisions in Theban society and offered an opportunity for 
those hungry for power to seize it. A corrupt dynasty, seeking to gain even more power, seized 
the opportunity provided by the Persian army. Second, he is relating the words of the Thebans, 
who are not speaking in the same style as he is. That this incident is reported by the Thebans and 
not Thucydides himself does not disqualify it from analysis as part of his narrative; since he 
would have known about the events of the Persian war as an educated Athenian, events in 
                                                
60 ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας µόνους αὖ Βοιωτῶν ἀττικίσαι (3.62.2). 
61 ἡµῖν µὲν γὰρ ἡ πόλις τότε ἐτύγχανεν οὔτε κατ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσόνοµον πολιτεύουσα οὔτε κατὰ δηµοκρατίαν 
(3.62.3). 
62  δυναστεία ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν (3.62.3). 
63 καὶ οὗτοι ἰδίας δυνάµεις ἐλπίσαντες ἔτι µᾶλλον σχήσειν εἰ τὰ τοῦ Μήδου κρατήσειε, κατέχοντες ἰσχύι τὸ πλῆθος 
ἐπηγάγοντο αὐτόν (3.62.4). 
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Plataea and the rest of Greece during the Persian wars would have affected his understanding of 
politics and stasis especially. Thus it merits a place alongside the rest of the staseis he includes.  
In the same speech the Thebans also accuse the Athenians of taking advantage of stasis to 
take control of much of their country: “it is necessary to look at how, with the Athenians 
attacking the rest of Greece and trying to take our land for themselves, and already having much 
of it because of faction (στάσιν)…” (3.62.5).64 The Thebans do not go into detail about their 
problem with stasis; however the important elements are present. The aggression of Athens 
caused a division in Theban society, which led to the paralysis of the city to the point where it 
could not defend its own territory.  
Furthermore, Thebes attacks Plataea in the first place because of stasis: Thucydides says 
that they were invited into the city by a faction of the riches and wealthiest (3.65.3). There is 
little other evidence about this event, but it provides another example of an oligarchic faction 
attempting to call in external allies and gain power. 
One final point harkens back to events predating the Plataean debate itself. When a 
Theban army was attacking Plataea, the Plataeans and Thebans negotiated a deal that if the 
Theban army left, then the Plataeans would release their Theban prisoners. The Thebans 
retreated, but the Plataeans executed their prisoners (3.66). This treachery is a notable example 
of the deceit which Thucydides has assigned to stasis—except in this case it occurred under 
different circumstances.65 
The Plataean debate raises questions about the freedom of cities divided by stasis or those 
under pressure from an invader. Both the Thebans and the Plataeans play down their own choice 
                                                
64 σκέψασθαι χρή, Ἀθηναίων ὕστερον ἐπιόντων τήν τε ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα καὶ τὴν ἡµετέραν χώραν πειρωµένων ὑφ᾽ 
αὑτοῖς ποιεῖσθαι καὶ κατὰ στάσιν ἤδη ἐχόντων αὐτῆς τὰ πολλά (3.62.5). 
65 Macleod, “Thucydides’ Plataean Debate,” pp. 108-9. 
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in deciding which side to ally themselves with—the Thebans with the Persians in 3.62.4 and the 
Plataeans with the Athenians in 3.55.4.66 
In these two episodes the Thebans reveal plenty of information about the staseis that 
affected them. They were externally motivated; it took an enemy army to bring about actual 
conflict that would lead to the second critical component, paralysis. There are no details about 
the duration of these staseis or the degree of violence—though the Thebans suggest that ‘ἰσχύς’ 
(force) was involved. Thucydides only mentions singular efforts by one party to bring in aid to 
seize power, instead of continual plotting by both sides. The characteristics of these staseis are 
similar to many others that Thucydides describes. 
 
Stasis in Sicily 
 Factionalism plays a large role in the Athenian invasion of Sicily. On several occasions 
leaders of the Sicilians discuss the threat or history of stasis in their country. Since these 
discussions of stasis do not occur in the context which Thucydides describes in 3.82—rival 
efforts to call in the Athenians or Spartans—and frequently refer to incidents occurring before 
the Peloponnesian war or discussions of stasis as a concept, they do not belong in a discussion of 
the staseis that Thucydides says followed Korkyra. 
 In 4.61 Thucydides describes a meeting of Sicilian cities, where Hermokrates warns other 
Sicilian representatives that it is important “to recognize that factionalism (στάσιν) most greatly 
destroys cities and Sicily” (4.61.1).67 Thucydides gives little context for this statement, but after 
the narrative of the Korkyrean stasis there is no need to elaborate.  
                                                
66 Ibid., p. 115. 
67 νοµίσαι τε στάσιν µάλιστα φθείρειν τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν Σικελίαν (4.61.1). 
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 In 6.5.1 Thucydides mentions that the town of Himera was partially colonized by 
“Syracusan refugees having been defeated in a civil war (στάσει)” (6.5.1).68 This brief reference 
is not very important, but reinforces the fact that in many cases defeated factions fled their cities 
instead of being killed. 
 Later, while discussing the Athenian invasion of Sicily the Syracusan Athenagoras says 
that Syracuse “is rarely at rest, but is subject to constant factions (στάσεις) and contests not more 
frequently against enemies than against itself” (6.38.3)69 as a result of its tendency to ignore 
internal problems and not take action when it learns of them (6.38.3). Thucydides does not 
provide any context about staseis in Syracuse, but Athenagoras goes on to add that the city 
suffers from τυραννίδας (tyrannies) and δυναστείας ἀδίκους (unjust oligarchies), all of which can 
occur as the result of stasis. This reference to stasis occurs in the direct speech of Athenagoras 
and provides no other information about the details of these conflicts. 
 Nonetheless, from the few details given it is clear that stasis in Syracuse arises naturally 
from private greed and ambition, and has little to do with external influence. Athenagoras clearly 
considers stasis an expected occurrence in Syracuse. There are no details about the level of 
violence that these staseis entail, but the comparison to wars against external enemies suggests 
that they are not bloodless.  
 Another stasis occurred during the Sicilian expedition when a conspiracy arose to call in 
the Athenians in Messena (6.74). Alcibiades gave information to an anti-Athenian group, who 
                                                
68 καὶ ἐκ Συρακουσῶν φυγάδες στάσει νικηθέντες (6.5.1). 
69 στάσεις δὲ πολλὰς καὶ ἀγῶνας οὐ πρὸς τοὺς πολεµίους πλέονας ἢ πρὸς αὑτὴν ἀναιρεῖται (6.38.3). While the 
Athenians were still deciding whether to invade Sicily, Alcibiades recommended the expedition on the grounds that 
all the Sicilians were in stasis  (στασιάζουσιν, 6.17.4). 
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“had before killed those men [those supporting the Athenians] and were then in a faction 
(στασιάζοντες)” (6.74.1).70  
 In 7.33 there is another stasis anecdote, where an anti-Athenian faction is driven out of 
Thourii in a civil war (7.33.5). In contrast with Messena, where one faction eliminated the other, 
in Thourii they merely expelled them from the city.  
In 7.46 Thucydides mentions that the Syracusans sent ships to reinforce an anti-Athenian 
faction in Akragas, which was in civil war. Akragas had previously been neutral (7.33.2)71 but 
apparently had been divided into factions over which side to take in the conflict. Eventually 
Thucydides reports that “the faction (στάσις) friendly to the Syracusans was driven out” 
(7.50.1).72 
 In the episodes listed in this chapter, Thucydides describes a number of staseis that occur 
before the Peloponnesian War, or with different origins than the Spartan-Athenian divide. In 
ancient times, factions fought over wealth and power, just as in later years. In most cases they 
were content to allow their defeated enemies to flee, as they were only interested in plunder and 
riches, not murder. Thucydides also uses the term stasis referring to divided societies such as 
Sparta, not just those actively fighting one another.  
 
IV. Stasis in Contexts similar to that of Korkyra 
The rest of the incidents of stasis in Thucydides’ work occur in a similar context as the 
Korkyrean stasis. Conflicts in this category take advantage of the existing divide between Sparta 
and Athens. Several incidents take place before the Korkyrean stasis, and one even before the 
war broke out. These can be understood in terms of Thucydides’ Korkyrean model because they 
                                                
70 οἱ δὲ τούς τε ἄνδρας διέφθειραν πρότερον καὶ τότε στασιάζοντες (6.74.1). 
71 Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, VII.32.1 (p.412). 
72 ἡ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις στάσις [ἐς] φιλία ἐξεπεπτώκει (7.50.1). 
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have arisen together with the conflict between the democrats and oligarchs, which Thucydides 
says inspired staseis after Korkyra (3.82.1). 
Surprisingly, many of these staseis occur under different circumstances than at Korkyra, 
where an initial conspiracy developed into an all-out civil war. Many staseis are the results of 
plots to bring in either the Athenians or the Spartans, but these plots themselves do not constitute 
a stasis; it is only when the city itself is openly struggling against itself that a stasis has occurred. 
In this aspect many incidents are different from Korkyra, with a stasis appearing that does not 
devolve to any terrible degree of violence, or a stasis not developing until an enemy army 
reaches the city gates and demands to be let in. 
 The details that Thucydides includes in his narratives of these staseis reveal a great 
diversity in these events. This diversity, combined with Thucydides’ analysis of the conflict at 
Korkyra, gives insight into how and why Thucydides chose Korkyra as the centerpiece of his 
stasis model and the location of one of his few personal authorial moral interjections. 
 
Stasis in Samos 
 Thucydides includes a brief narrative of the Samian revolution of 441-440 BCE.73 While 
he does not use the term stasis to describe the situation, he clearly considers the Samian 
revolution to be the result of stasis. Thucydides explains that when a war broke out between 
Samos and Miletus, the Milesians sent an embassy to Athens to condemn the Samians, and, 
“they were aided also by some private individuals from Samos desiring to overthrow the 
government,” (1.115.2).74 This description of a faction of Samians exactly matches many of 
Thucydides’ other passages of stasis. 
                                                
73 Date from Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides, I.115.2 (p.188). 
74 ξυνεπελάβοντο δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς Σάµου ἄνδρες ἰδιῶται νεωτερίσαι βουλόµενοι τὴν πολιτείαν (1.115.2). 
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Athens was able to send a force to Samos and install a democracy, but yet another faction 
overthrew this new government: “for certain men of the Samians were not staying behind, but 
fled to the mainland, allying with the most powerful of the men in the city and Pissouthnes son 
of Hystaspes…and first they rose against the people and overthrew the majority, then…they 
revolted” (1.115.4-5).75 The revolt ended with a nine-month siege and Samian surrender to 
Athenian imperial authority. Thucydides does not report any particularly harsh terms of 
surrender; the Samians had to tear down their walls, hand over hostages and ships, and pay war 
retributions. Instead of the brutal treatment of later revolutionaries like those at Mytilene, these 
defeated enemies are granted mercy and allowed to live. 
This incident occurred long before the Korkyrean stasis, but already Thucydides has 
introduced elements of his stasis model that become more common later on. In fact, the Samian 
revolution very closely resembles the Korkyrean stasis: both conflicts had long duration and 
caused several violent clashes. If this stasis had occurred after the declaration of war in 431 BCE, 
it is possible that Thucydides would have centered his stasis model around this conflict instead of 
Korkyra. However, this episode takes place during 440 BCE, in one of the final chapters of his 
narrative of the Pentekontaetia. It succinctly summarizes one of the final pre-war challenges to 
Athenian imperial power.  
 
Stasis at Epidamnos 
 After completing his Archaeology of Greece, Thucydides begins to narrate the events of 
the Peloponnesian War itself. He begins by describing a conflict between Corinth and Korkyra 
over Epidamnos, a colony of Korkyra. This conflict arose, he says, because of a stasis in 
                                                
75 τῶν δὲ Σαµίων ἦσαν γάρ τινες οἳ οὐχ ὑπέµειναν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔφυγον ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον, ξυνθέµενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τοῖς 
δυνατωτάτοις καὶ Πισσούθνῃ τῷ Ὑστάσπου ξυµµαχίαν, ὃς …καὶ πρῶτον µὲν τῷ δήµῳ ἐπανέστησαν καὶ ἐκράτησαν 
τῶν πλείστων, ἔπειτα…ἀπέστησαν (1.115.4-5). 
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Epidamnos: “Being in conflict (στασιάσαντες) amongst themselves for many years, it is said, on 
account of a war with some of their neighboring barbarians, they were ruined and were deprived 
of the bulk of their power” (1.24.4).76 It is worth noting that Thucydides attributes the beginning 
of actual Peloponnesian War to this event, a stasis in Epidamnos.77 
 The circumstances of this stasis distinguish it from both the Korkyrean stasis and the 
historical staseis in Thucydides’ Archaeology. In Epidamnos, as in Korkyra, there was both a 
democratic party and an oligarchic aristocratic party. However, in this conflict, the democratic 
party struck first and “expelled the powerful” (1.24.5).78 Thucydides here uses δυνατούς, which 
implies in this context that the dispute was not over the form of government of Epidamnos, as in 
Korkyra, but rather over wealth and influence. While in Korkyra, the democrats fought the 
oligarchs over the idea that the government would be in the hands of a few, in Epidamnos, the 
conflict was just between those individuals who happened to have power and those who did not. 
Thucydides shows that while this stasis was fought between parties that resembled those in 
Korkyra, the subject of their quarrel was different.  
 After this expulsion, “those who had been expelled along with barbarians ransacked those 
in the city on both land and sea” (1.24.5).79 The elites of Epidamnos, not willing to give up their 
privileged position in the city, allied themselves with neighboring barbarians and began to attack 
the city. In addition, they traveled to Korkyra, where they asked their allies in their mother city to 
restore them (1.26.3). The democrats in the city also sent to Korkyra for aid in defending 
themselves, events which began the larger conflict of the Peloponnesian war. 
                                                
76 στασιάσαντες δὲ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἔτη πολλά, ὡς λέγεται, ἀπὸ πολέµου τινὸς τῶν προσοίκων βαρβάρων ἐφθάρησαν 
καὶ τῆς δυνάµεως τῆς πολλῆς ἐστερήθησαν. (1.24.4). 
77 Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides, I.24.1 (p. 68). 
78 ἐξεδίωξε τοὺς δυνατούς (1.24.5). 
79 οἱ δὲ ἐπελθόντες µετὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐλῄζοντο τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει κατά τε γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν (1.24.5). 
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 Another notable point of this passage is that Thucydides describes Epidamnos as “divided 
by faction (στασιάσαντες) for many years” (1.24.4),80 despite the fact that the friction between 
the two factions in the city only deteriorated into open violence after the democrats expelled the 
elites from the city. After this, Thucydides calls the conflict a “πολέµος” (war). This is distinct 
from his other passages later in the work, where he refers to internal conflicts as staseis, 
regardless of the level of violence. It is possible that he refers to the conflict between the 
democrats of Epidamnos and the alliance of elites and barbarians as a war because of the 
involvement of the barbarians, but later in his work he refers to similarly ‘internationalized’ civil 
wars as stasis. 
Stasis in Athens   
 In the first year of the Peloponnesian War, King Archidamos of Sparta led an invasion of 
Attica to plunder the region. He made his camp near Acharnai, near the city of Athens proper. He 
chose this place for his camp because the Acharnians, “being a large portion of the city (for they 
numbered three thousand hoplites)” (2.20.4),81 would be loath to allow their property outside the 
city walls to be destroyed. Archidamos correctly reasoned that “if the Athenians did not come 
out and fight against the attack in that area [Acharnai], then without fear he might assault the rest 
of plain and attack the city itself” (2.20.4).82 Furthermore, “the Acharnians, having been robbed 
of their own things, would not be equally zealous to take action on behalf of the property of 
others and there would be factionalism (στάσιν) in their counsels” (2.20.4).83 His plan worked to 
                                                
80 στασιάσαντες δὲ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἔτη πολλά (1.24.4). 
81 Ἀχαρνῆς µέγα µέρος ὄντες τῆς πόλεως (τρισχίλιοι γὰρ ὁπλῖται ἐγένοντο) (2.20.4). Hornblower, A Commentary on 
Thucydides, II.22.1 (pp. 273-4) remarks that the figure 3,000 is too large, calculating that they had at most 1,100 
hoplites. He suggests that Thucydides meant πολῖται, which would make 3,000 a more accurate figure. 
82 εἴ τε καὶ µὴ ἐπεξέλθοιεν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἐσβολῇ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδεέστερον ἤδη ἐς τὸ ὕστερον τό τε πεδίον τεµεῖν καὶ 
πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν χωρήσεσθαι. 
83 τοὺς γὰρ Ἀχαρνέας ἐστερηµένους τῶν σφετέρων οὐχ ὁµοίως προθύµους ἔσεσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων 
κινδυνεύειν, στάσιν δ᾽ ἐνέσεσθαι τῇ γνώµῃ (2.20.4). 
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a degree; Athens faced mild disorder, and Pericles sent out cavalry patrols, one of which was 
defeated, giving the Spartans their first victory of the war (2.22.1). 
This stasis is nonviolent. The dissension that Archidamos brings to Athenian politics is 
not a bloody conflict such as famous staseis like Korkyra. Thucydides mentions that groups in 
Athens formed and argued over what to do, he says that they were “formed in groups (ξυστάσεις) 
in much strife” (2.21.3).84 Archidamos proved prescient as the Acharnians, “thinking along the 
lines that they themselves were not the smallest portion of the Athenians, as it was their own land 
that was threatened, were the most in favor of a sortie” (2.21.3).85 
Archidamos did not want a change in Athenian leadership, only a disintegration of 
Athenian unity. Dissension would paralyze Athens, as Thucydides has shown stasis to do, 
allowing Archidamos and his army greater freedom in Attica without the threat of an Athenian 
army at full strength. Unfortunately for him, Pericles proved skillful enough to prevent the 
division from coming to open violence. Thucydides divides this portion of the narrative of the 
Spartan invasion into two sections. The first part, in 2.20, summarizes Archidamos’ frame of 
mind and strategy for inducing stasis into Athenian politics. The second section, 2.21, describes 
the actual effect of his operations.86 The contrast between ξυστάσις and στάσις becomes clear; 
although the city is divided, Pericles is able to keep control of the city. Thucydides’ use of 
ξυστάσις indicates the degree which a division in a city must reach before it can be a στάσις. 
                                                
84 κατὰ ξυστάσεις τε γιγνόµενοι ἐν πολλῇ ἔριδι ἦσαν (2.21.3). Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, ad 
loc. (p. 75) comments that these are informal groups and meetings. In stasis, parties are more formalized. 
85  οἵ τε Ἀχαρνῆς οἰόµενοι παρὰ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐλαχίστην µοῖραν εἶναι Ἀθηναίων, ὡς αὐτῶν ἡ γῆ ἐτέµνετο, 
ἐνῆγον τὴν ἔξοδον µάλιστα (2.21.3). In Gomme’s view, Archidamos’ plan was tactically ineffectual, since the 
Acharnians remained “as warlike and as hostile to any compromise with the Spartans as ever.” (Gomme, A 
Historical Commentary on Thucydides, ad loc, p. 74) Regardless of the tactical efficacy of the scheme, Thucydides 
shows that it was successful to some degree in creating stasis, even if that stasis did not devolve to the desired 
degree. 
86 On this narrative see Hunter, Virginia. Thucydides: The Artful Reporter (Toronto: Hakkert, 1973), pp. 11-21. 
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Athens has not met the criteria for a full στάσις, perhaps ecause this ‘dissension’ is not 
the result of a desire for ἀρχή or any greater wealth; the Acharnian faction in Athens has simply 
lost its motivation to fight alongside the rest of the city. By destroying Acharnian lands, 
Archidamos created a division between Athenians with nothing more to lose (ὡς αὐτῶν ἡ γῆ 
ἐτέµνετο, 2.21.3) and those who still had property to defend. This division is unrelated to the 
causes of the staseis at Korkyra. 
Furthermore, this stasis could only occur because of external circumstances; without the 
threat and manipulation of Archidamos and his army, there would be no disagreement in Athens. 
Thucydides describes earlier staseis in the same way he describes the plague: an event that is 
endogenous to the city where it arises. Here he portrays the Athenian stasis as a division created 
by external circumstances. The stasis in Korkyra likewise is caused by external influences, and 
Thucydides confirms that the wave of staseis that swept through Greece after Korkyra was also 
caused or facilitated by the division between pro-Spartan and pro-Athenian factions in the cities. 
However, this stasis in Athens is worth examining because while other staseis may have been 
caused by the ongoing war, this particular division only arose because of the threat of a Spartan 
army only a few miles away. The immediate presence of enemy forces created a division in the 
city between those who had more to lose and less to lose because of a certain course of action—
in this case offering battle. In later examples of stasis these actions differ, but there is a clear 
distinction between staseis caused by the larger war in general and those caused by the arrival of 





Stasis in Larisa 
In 2.22.3 Thucydides uses στάσις with a different meaning. Recounting Thessalian 
assistance to Athens during the first Spartan invasion, he describes two Larisan commanders, 
Polymedes and Aristonous, as ἀπὸ τῆς στάσεως ἑκάτερος, (2.22.3), or ‘each from a party.’ This 
comment implies that the city of Larisa is in στάσις  (factional conflict), since there are two 
στάσεις (parties). It is remarkable that the city of Larisa was able to unite to the degree that it 
could send aid to Athens, under the command of two leaders from different parties. This belies 
the image Thucydides has created of cities paralyzed with infighting. Furthermore, this episode 
shows that stasis before Korkyra was not necessarily brutal and violent.  
 
Stasis in Mytilene 
 Thucydides also suggests that stasis played a part in the Mytilenian revolt in book three. 
He says that the Tenedians, the Methymnians and “men of the Mytilenians who were in a faction 
(στάσιν) on a private basis” (3.2.3)87 gave the Athenians advance warning that the cities of 
Lesbos were “pressing on to a revolution (ἀποστάσει)” (3.2.3).88 Because of this warning the 
Athenians were able to launch a preventative attack on Mytilene. This mention of stasis contrasts 
with many others in Thucydides’ work. On Lesbos, a faction exists when it reveals the majority’s 
plans to revolt from Athens. In most other examples that Thucydides gives, the faction arises to 
advocate for revolution. In addition, there is no violence involved, only an unauthorized 
communication.  
 
                                                
87 καὶ αὐτῶν Μυτιληναίων ἰδίᾳ ἄνδρες κατὰ στάσιν (3.2.3). Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides, ad loc. (p. 
383) takes κατὰ στάσιν to mean “of the opposite faction” and notes that Aristotle (Politics 1304a4ff) attributes this 
stasis to a dispute between two individuals over women (which gives Thucydides a good reason for using ἰδίᾳ). 
88 ἐπὶ ἀποστάσει ἐπείγονται (3.2.3). 
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Stasis in Rhegium 
 In the opening lines of Book 4, Thucydides mentions a stasis occurring simultaneously 
(and possibly even before) the stasis at Korkyra. He says that “for Rhegium for a long time was 
in stasis (ἐστασίαζε), and was powerless in their present situation to ward off the Lokrians, who 
were attacking even more” (4.1.3).89 
Thucydides does not reveal whether the Rhegian stasis was occurring because of the 
Peloponnesian war, or whether this is another example of a civil war carried out for personal 
gain unrelated to the Spartan-Athenian conflict. But again he is consistent in showing how stasis 
paralyzed, or at the very least weakened, a city. In addition, he mentions that the Lokrians invade 
Rhegium partially because they were “being invited in by Rhegian refugees” (4.1.3).90  The 
Lokrians also hoped to prevent the Rhegians from aiding the Messenians in Sicily, who were 
revolting from Athens (4.1.1).  
Rhegium was allied with Athens, and harbored democratic Messenian refugees. Messena, 
Thucydides says, had invited Syracuse and Lokris in to help them defect. In order to prevent 
Rhegium from sending assistance to a democratic faction in Messena, Lokris kept Rhegium 
occupied by ravaging its territory.  
Thucydides does not describe the situation in Messena as a stasis. However, what he 
describes resembles stasis in so far as the city has invited a foreign power to help it break free of 
an alliance with Athens, and moreover, the fight over this defection was lengthy enough that 
Lokris was able to raise a force and carry out operations to support one of the factions. 
 
 
                                                
89  τὸ γὰρ Ῥήγιον ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἐστασίαζε καὶ ἀδύνατα ἦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοὺς Λοκροὺς ἀµύνεσθαι, ᾗ καὶ 
µᾶλλον ἐπετίθεντο. (4.1.3). 
90 ξυνεπαγόντων Ῥηγίνων φυγάδων (ibid.). 
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Stasis at Megara 
 Thucydides devotes a long passage to a stasis in Megara in 424 BCE. Originally, Megara 
had been in turmoil from a stasis in 427 BCE, the same year as the Korkyrean stasis. In this 
original stasis, the popular faction had been victorious and expelled the oligarchs. Here 
Thucydides refers to the popular faction as πλῆθος, instead of δῆµος. This nomenclature suggests 
that the factions in the Megarian stasis were divided along slightly different lines than the 
obvious oligarchic-democratic schism.91 Thucydides gives one clue in 3.51, where he describes 
an Athenian expedition that seized Minoa, an island fort, from the Megarians. Soon after this 
humiliation, the πλῆθος revolted and expelled the oligarchs,92 perhaps more for their 
incompetence than for any ideological differences.93 
Whatever the case, Megara did not side with Athens, the democratic power, after this 
stasis. Thucydides says that the city was “under pressure from the Athenians in the war, who 
were invading their land twice every year” (4.66.1).94 In addition, the exiles that had been driven 
from the city in 427 BCE, now based at Pagai, were fighting as raiders and brigands 
(λῃστεύοντες). By 424 BCE the threat of war on two fronts led moderate Megarians to suggest 
recalling the exiles, and the remaining allies of the oligarchs added their voices to this proposal. 
The democratic leaders of the city feared that the returning oligarchs would attempt to regain 
their power. Support for the democracy was far from certain; the shaky government rested only 
                                                
91 Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, IV.66.1 (p.528) says that the people in 427 BCE were more 
“patriotic than loyal to party,” an excellent contrast with the later stasis in 424 BCE. 
92 Those expelled were the extreme oligarchs; their more moderate allies remained in the city and still had a voice in 
public affairs (Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides, ad loc. (p.231.)). 
93 Puckett, Scott. “Stasis in the Ancient Greek Historians.” PhD diss., Tulane University, 2013, p. 178. 
94 οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει πιεζόµενοι ὑπό τε Ἀθηναίων τῷ πολέµῳ, αἰεὶ κατὰ ἔτος ἕκαστον δὶς ἐσβαλλόντων πανστρατιᾷ ἐς 
τὴν χώραν (4.66.1). 
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on continued safety, and already “the people did not have the strength to be steadfast to them [the 
democratic leaders] on account of the evils” (4.66.3)95 they had suffered. 
The democratic leaders thus decided to invite Athens into the city. Their logic was sound; 
as leaders of a democratic faction, they could reasonably expect to remain in power in Megara, 
even under Athenian hegemony. However, the returning oligarchs would surely learn from their 
counterparts in Korkyra and try to convince Megara’s Peloponnesian allies to oust the 
democratic government.  
This sequence of events is characteristic of the incidents of stasis that Thucydides says 
followed Korkyra. However, the only instance in this passage where he describes the situation as 
a stasis is when he refers to the original conflict that caused the expulsion of the oligarchs. When 
he narrates the invitation of the Athenian generals, he does not use the common ἐπάγω, meaning 
‘to bring on,’ but uses ποιοῦνται λόγους. (4.66.3). Thucydides’ narrative technique is the cause 
for this second irregularity; in this passage he is describing in detail the scheme to bring in the 
Athenians, and thus has no need to use the more general term. However, the non-appearance of 
στάσις is noteworthy. 
The ensuing violence in Megara was neither as pervasive nor as lengthy as in Korkyra, 
but it was just as inventive; the democrats killed the guards at the city gate while a boat was 
passing through at night, allowing a small Athenian force hidden nearby to rush through and 
enter the city while a larger force gathered outside (4.68.3). This clever plan is one concrete 
example supporting Thucydides’ claim that later factions devised clever stratagems to seize 
power.  
At dawn, seeing an Athenian army outside their gates, the Megarians prepared to march 
out for battle. The conspirators planned to let the Athenian army into the city when the gates 
                                                
95 οὐ δυνατὸν τὸν δῆµον ἐσόµενον ὑπὸ τῶν κακῶν µετὰ σφῶν καρτερεῖν (4.66.3). 
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were opened. However, one of the conspirators, fearing for his own safety in the battle that 
would necessarily follow, exposed the plot, leaving the Athenian army stranded outside. The 
Athenian generals turned their attention to Nisaea, which still held Peloponnesian troops 
originally intended to keep Megara from defecting, and began siege operations; they soon seized 
it. 
The Spartiate Brasidas happened to be nearby and raised a force of Peloponnesian allies 
to defend Nisaea. He raced ahead of the main army and reached Megara undetected by the 
Athenians with a force of three hundred men (4.70). Upon his arrival Megara was once again 
divided into factions—here Thucydides writes “αἱ δὲ τῶν Μεγαρέων στάσεις” (4.71.1), the only 
time in this episode. In contrast to other circumstances, here ‘στάσεις’ refers to the factions 
themselves instead of the state of stasis. However, the use of this term to refer to the divided 
groups of the city instead of ‘δῆµος,’ ‘δυνατοι,’ or ‘πλῆθος,’ suggests Thucydides considered 
Megara to be in stasis.  
The arrival of Brasidas with the promise of a Peloponnesian army counterbalanced the 
Athenian threat to Megara. However, it did little to end the division within the city. The 
democratic leaders refused to let Brasidas into Megara, fearing that he would recall the 
oligarchic exiles to ensure that Megara would remain loyal to Sparta. The friends of the 
oligarchic exiles had the most to gain from Brasidas and a new oligarchic government. However, 
they feared that the democrats would incite the δῆµος to kill them in retribution for overthrowing 
the democracy. In addition, both parties anticipated a battle between Brasidas and the Athenian 
force, and thus decided to await the outcome of the battle before deciding whom to support. 
Neither side allowed Brasidas into the city, until after a few days the Athenians refused battle 
and retreated into Nisaea, leaving Brasidas the victor. Afterwards, the friends of the oligarchic 
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exiles brought him into the city. Later, the Megarians who had conspired with Athens fled, and 
the oligarchic exiles returned to the city (4.74.2). The Megarians established an extreme 
oligarchy, which Thucydides says lasted for longer than any other revolutionary government 
(4.74).96 
 At Megara, both factions had three years of awareness of earlier events at Korkyra, 
whose origins were somewhat similar. The internal balance of power at Korkyra quickly shifted 
with the arrival of an Athenian or Spartan fleet. At Megara, the democratic leaders faced a loss 
of control when Brasidas arrived at the city with his army close behind him. Despite comparable 
circumstances, the stasis at Megara never devolved to a Korkyrean level of violence beyond the 
original attempt to bring the Athenians into the city, and the guilty conspirators were able to 
escape the city with their lives. However, Thucydides does show how the plotting factions use 
clever tricks to get allies, and the rival factions are ready and willing to kill each other, until 
Brasidas arrives and is able to somewhat defuse the situation, like Pericles when Archidamos 
laid waste to Acharnai. The paranoia shown by the conspirators recalls Thucydides’ comments in 
3.82. Here at least is one episode confirming his judgments there. 
 
Subversive Campaigns  
 Perhaps learning from the possibilities of the incident at Megara, both the Athenians and 
the Spartans engaged in a series of civil conflicts later in the summer of 424 BCE. Thucydides 
reports that Demosthenes, the Athenian general who had attempted to take Megara, immediately 
withdrew from the city and sailed to Naupaktos. He intended to support pro-Athenian factions in 
Boiotia and help certain men in the cities, “who were desiring to change the order [of 
                                                
96 Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides, ad loc. (p. 244) clarifies that it is unknown how long this government 
actually lasted. 
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government] and turn it toward a democracy just as the Athenians had” (4.76.2).97 Thucydides 
does not call these ‘certain men’ (τινων ἀνδρῶν) stasiotai, but his description of their plotting to 
use Athenian force to bring themselves to power in their cities matches exactly his description in 
3.82.1 of such schemes. 
 This Boiotian conspiracy was led by exiles from several cities, who hoped not only to 
restore their fortunes but also to seize power for themselves. The conspirators planned to betray 
Siphai and Chaironeia while Athens seized Delion on an appointed day, so no city could 
reinforce another. The plan was not a complete success; the Boeotians learned of the plot and 
fought several battles against Athenian forces (4.89-97). 
 On the Peloponnesian side of the war, Brasidas also embarked on a campaign of 
subversion immediately after Megara. Several cities in Thrace had revolted from Athens, and 
more were conspiring against Athens secretly (4.79.2). These cities asked Sparta for assistance 
and offered to support the Peloponnesian army, since they were “summoning them to support 
their revolution (ἀποστάσει)” (4.80.1).98 
 Thucydides reports that Brasidas was Sparta’s first choice for this mission, as “showing 
himself just and moderate toward the cities he subverted many, and seized places by treachery” 
(4.81.2).99 His objectives were almost identical to the Athenians’ in Boiotia: support any 
revolutions against Athens in Thrace and convince as many cities as possible to switch sides.  
 Brasidas “immediately campaigned against Akanthos” (4.84.1),100 and his arrival threw 
the city into stasis (ἐστασίαζον).101 Thucydides records Brasidas’ address to the Akanthians, and 
                                                
97 ἐπράσσετο, βουλοµένων µεταστῆσαι τὸν κόσµον καὶ ἐς δηµοκρατίαν ὥσπερ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι  τρέψαι (4.76.2). 
98 ἐπὶ ἀποστάσει σφᾶς ἐπικαλουµένων (4.80.1). 
99 ἑαυτὸν παρασχὼν δίκαιον καὶ µέτριον ἐς τὰς πόλεις ἀπέστησε τὰ πολλά, τὰ δὲ προδοσίᾳ εἷλε τῶν χωρίων 
(4.81.2). Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides, ad loc. (p. 270) points out the contrast between Brasidas’ 
moderation and his seizing cities by treachery, but concludes that it is Brasidas’ own character that facilitates the 
creation of many pro-Spartan factions. 
100 θέρει εὐθὺς ὁ Βρασίδας…ἐπὶ Ἄκανθον… ἐστράτευσεν. (4.84.1). 
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even grudgingly admits that Brasidas was “an effective speaker, for a Spartan” (4.84.2).102 This 
speech reveals the influences on each of the factions in every besieged or divided city.  
 Chief among these influences was the proximity and reliability of military support for 
each faction. Even though a Spartan army could offer immediate support to an oligarchic faction 
in Akanthos, it would be little help unless it could defeat the inevitable Athenian counterattack. 
Likewise, Peloponnesian allies considering defection would also have to judge the likelihood of 
Spartan punishment, and whether Athenian support would be enough. Brasidas attempted to 
allay these fears by telling the Akanthians how the Athenians refused to fight him at Nisaea, 
even though their army was larger than his (4.85.7). This reassurance was intended to convince 
Akanthos that letting his army into the city and siding with Sparta would be the safest decision in 
the long run.  
 In contrast, the immediate threat of an army outside the city walls was no small concern. 
Thucydides reports that the Akanthians were worried about fruit which was still outside the city 
walls (4.84.2), and later in his speech Brasidas threatened to lay waste to Akanthian land. 
Judging whether the immediate or future threat was more serious was critical to a besieged or 
defecting city. 
 In addition, Brasidas assured the Akanthians that he would not install a Spartan puppet 
government; any besieged city would have to suspect that once an enemy was inside the walls he 
would guarantee future loyalty by putting his own supporters in power. He promised that allies 
that he brings over to Sparta will be autonomous (4.86.1), in contrast to the cities ‘enslaved’ by 
the Athenians. 
                                                                                                                                                       
101 Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, IV.84.2 notes that the stasis is between those who invited 
Brasidas and “ὁ δῆµος” (4.84.2), implying that the majority of the people in Akanthos, not just their leaders, 
supported Athens.  
102 ἦν δὲ οὐδὲ ἀδύνατος, ὡς Λακεδαιµόνιος, εἰπεῖν (4.84.2). 
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 Furthermore, he claimed that he will not enslave “the majority to the few or the minority 
to everyone” (4.86.4).103 Since both Athens and Sparta established democratic and oligarchic 
governments to secure the loyalty of their allies, changing sides—and gaining power in the 
process—often meant overthrowing the current system of government. Once Brasidas arrived 
and attempted to negotiate the defection of Akanthos, beliefs about systems of government were 
less important than loyalty to Sparta—as the Plataean debate showed. His promise to install a 
government fair to both parties alleviated the fears of the democratic party, who would expect to 
be expelled, killed, or somehow coerced into cooperation. 
 Ultimately, Brasidas convinced the Akanthians. They decided by vote to revolt from 
Athens, having considered both the advantages of defecting and the dangers of refusing (4.88.1). 
Brasidas continued on his mission, and Thucydides reports that not long after other cities joined 
the revolt, including Stagiros (4.88.2), Amphipolis (4.103.3), Myrkinos, Gelepsis, and Oisyme 
(4.107.3), Thyssos, Kleone, Akrothoi, Olophyxos (4.109.3), Torone (4.114), Lekythos (4.116.2), 
Scione (4.120.1), and Mende (4.123.1).  
These incidents reveal an notable flaw in Thucydides’ Korkyrean stasis narrative. While 
he claims that Korkyra inspired the rest of Greece and pushed them towards stasis, in his own 
work there is a much stronger connection between the stasis at Megara and a wave of plots to 
call in Athens or Sparta. Immediately after Megara both the Athenians under Demosthenes and 
the Spartans under Brasidas embarked on a campaign of subversion to separate their enemies 
from their allies. They were successful in many cases because factions within the cities invited 
them in. Stasis in Thucydides’ narrative often takes place inside a city which is threatened by an 
army outside its gates.104 
                                                
103 τὸ πλέον τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἢ τὸ ἔλασσον τοῖς πᾶσι (4.86.4). 
104 Puckett, Scott. “Stasis in the Ancient Greek Historians,” p. 177.  
 44 
 In contrast, at Korkyra, the violence of the stasis was largely due to endogenous factors. 
external allies did not commit any of the atrocities that make Korkyra unique—although their 
presence did embolden the faction allied with them. On the subversive campaigns of Brasidas 
and Demosthenes, people in stasis did not commit particularly violent acts against each other—
except for the occasional assassination. In fact, Brasidas was remarkably lenient, allowing 
defeated Athenians in Amphipolis and Torone to stay in the city and keep their property or to 
leave with their possessions (4.105.2, 4.114.1). But none of the religious impieties that occurred 
at Korkyra were repeated on any large scale in Greece.  
 
Stasis in Parrhasia 
 Perhaps inspired by Brasidas’ efforts, the Spartan king Pleistonax led an army into 
Arcadia against the Parrhasians, where a faction (στάσιν) in the city had asked the Spartans to 
free them from their Athenian masters (5.33.1).105 Thucydides does not provide many details 
about this stasis—he only uses the term to refer to the faction inviting the Spartans. Pleistonax 
destroyed the Athenian fortress and liberated the city, then returned to Sparta (5.33.3). The 
circumstances of this episode suggest that the Spartan operation was more a military campaign 
than a civil conflict. There is no report of violence within the city, and the emphasis of the 
narrative is on the Spartans.  
 
Stasis in Argos  
 In 5.76 Thucydides reports another stasis taking place in 418 BCE. The Spartans went out 
on campaign to Argos, where “they had men friendly to them and desiring to overthrow the 
                                                
105 Presumably the oligarchic faction: Cartwright, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, ad loc. (p.210). 
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democracy in Argos” (5.76.2).106 The Spartans intended to use their army to give their allies in 
the city good reason to suggest an alliance with Sparta, then overthrow the democracy. 
Thucydides gives unique attention to this episode and records speeches given by some of the 
conspirators to the assembly to trick them into allying with Sparta. This alliance lasted for some 
time, and eventually a Spartan army returned, overthrew the oligarchy and installed an oligarchy 
(5.81.2).  
 After a year of oligarchic rule, the democratic faction launched a counterattack on the 
oligarchs and were victorious; “they killed some and drove out others” (5.82.2).107 This is one of 
the few pitched battles—here Thucydides uses µάχη—that occurs during a stasis, and is 
distinctly reminiscent of the civil war in Korkyra. In addition, this conflict lasted longer than 
usual; the Spartans ignored the calls for aid of the oligarchs in the city for some time (5.82.3) and 
were too late to prevent their defeat. The next year, Sparta retaliated and campaigned against 
Argos, tearing down newly constructed walls and killing all the men in the Argive village of 
Hysiai.  
 This stasis is one of the most violent that Thucydides mentions. Pitched battles within a 
city between two factions are rare in his work, and this incident seems particularly vicious. Even 
after driving out the oligarchs, the Argives later campaigned against the village where they had 
settled in hopes to finish them off (5.83.3). Thucydides surely felt this example of a post-
Korkyrean stasis would shock his readers, but he does not make any condemnations of this 
retaliation. However, there is a conspicuous lack of the treachery and duplicity present in 
Korkyra. Missing also are violations of sanctuaries. Nonetheless, this episode is an important 
                                                
106 ἦσαν δὲ αὐτοῖς πρότερόν τε ἄνδρες ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ βουλόµενοι τὸν δῆµον τὸν ἐν Ἄργει καταλῦσαι (5.76.2). 
107 τοὺς µὲν ἀπέκτεινε, τοὺς δὲ ἐξήλασεν (5.82.2). 
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part of Thucydides’ stasis model, as it reinforces his claim that factions after Korkyra were more 
willing to kill their rivals than before. 
 
More Stasis in Athens  
 Thucydides gives a lengthy narrative of the coup at Athens in 411 BCE. This coup is the 
ultimate struggle between oligarchic and democratic factions in Athens during the Peloponnesian 
war. With the city still reeling from the disastrous campaign in Sicily, oligarchic elements 
conspired with Alcibiades to replace the Athenian democracy with an oligarchy. Thucydides 
reports that while Alcibiades did in fact send word to the most powerful, “more on their own 
account themselves, the trierarchs at Samos and the most powerful of the Athenians were eager 
to destroy the democracy” (8.47.2).108  
Thus, the Athenian internal conflict—Thucydides does not call it a stasis yet—began 
internally, with the promise of external support from Persia. These circumstances resemble those 
of many smaller cities caught in the middle of the Peloponnesian war. Athens is now forced to 
‘choose’ between democracy and oligarchy. The current government is a democracy, but an 
external actor can provide conspirators with personal power if they overthrow the government 
and install a democracy. Thucydides points out that it is not so much ideology that motivates 
Alcibiades as the desire to return home (8.48.4). Surely similar motivations inspired the other 
conspirators. 
 One conspirator opposed recalling Alcibiades and the change of government. The general 
Phrynichos put forward several convincing arguments against the plot, but was overruled. He 
                                                
108  τὸ δὲ πλέον καὶ ἀπὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάµῳ τριήραρχοί τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ δυνατώτατοι ὥρµηντο ἐς τὸ 
καταλῦσαι τὴν δηµοκρατίαν (8.47.2). Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover, Historical Commentary on Thucydides 
(Oxford University Press, 1981), VIII.48.4 (p. 108) add that Thucydides clearly agrees with Phrynichos’ opinions of 
stasis. 
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stated, “this was best for them, that they not be in stasis (στασιάσωσιν)” (8.48.4).109 Here some 
of Thucydides’ requirements for stasis become clearer: the presence of a conspiracy at Samos 
does not create a stasis in Athens. It is only when the conspiracy begins operations in Athens 
itself that the city would be in stasis.  
 Some members of the conspiracy returned to Athens to argue before the assembly that 
Alcibiades could bring the Persian satrap Tissaphernes into the war on the Athenian side, and 
thus should be recalled to the city. Thucydides reports that the people of Athens gave up their 
democracy willingly. Convinced by the conspirator Peisandros that “there would be no other 
salvation” (8.54.1)110, they gave way. Alcibiades proved unable to persuade Tissaphernes, and 
Athens was left with no foreign support and a new oligarchic government. Peisandros and other 
conspirators, returning from the embassy to Tissaphernes, established oligarchies in Samos 
(8.63.3), Thasos (8.64.2), and all along the coast on their route to Athens (8.65.1)—although 
many of these cities, newly freed from democracy, “went right on to freedom, not valuing good 
law and order under the Athenians” (8.64.5).111 
 By the time they arrive in Athens, the rule of the oligarchy is well underway. In 8.66 
Thucydides includes an interesting passage that resembles 3.82. Thucydides describes the reign 
of terror under the oligarchs, saying that the Council of the Bean “discussed nothing that did not 
suit the conspirators” (8.66.1).112 Thucydides adds that “if someone should even speak out, 
immediately in some fitting way he was killed” (8.66.2)113, and that “anyone not suffering 
violence considered it a gain, even if he had remained silent” (8.66.2).114 These moralizing 
                                                
109 σφίσι δὲ περιοπτέον εἶναι τοῦτο µάλιστα, ὅπως µὴ στασιάσωσιν (8.48.4). 
110  µὴ εἶναι ἄλλην σωτηρίαν (8.54.1). 
111 ἐχώρησαν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄντικρυς ἐλευθερίαν τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπούλου εὐνοµίας οὐ προτιµήσαντες (8.64.5). 
112  ἐβούλευον δὲ οὐδὲν ὅτι µὴ τοῖς ξυνεστῶσι δοκοίη (8.66.1). 
113  εἰ δέ τις καὶ ἀντείποι, εὐθὺς ἐκ τρόπου τινὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἐτεθνήκει (8.66.2). 
114 κέρδος ὁ µὴ πάσχων τι βίαιον, εἰ καὶ σιγῴη, ἐνόµιζεν (8.66.2). 
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comments closely resemble those in 3.82 where Thucydides condemns the events in Korkyra. It 
also shows how Athenians were more and more willing to kill their own fellow citizens. 
 It is important to note that these crimes occurred while the conspiracy was still in 
progress. Peisandros had not yet returned to the city and established the Council of Four Hundred 
(8.67-68). The circumstances in which the Athenian reign of terror occurred closely resemble 
those of the stasis in Korkyra, where no single government was in charge. In Athens, an ongoing 
conspiracy against the standing government leads to violence and fear, just as in Korkyra the 
active oligarchic conspiracy against the democrats led to murder and the civil war. 
Thucydides does describe violence under the Four Hundred—“the Four Hundred, each 
with a hidden dagger…set on the Councilors of the Bean in the council house and told them to 
leave taking their pay” (8.69.4).115 Later “they killed some certain men, not a great 
number…imprisoned others…and exiled some” (8.70.2).116 However, this violence is not on par 
with that of the earlier conspiracy, and absolutely not the equal of that in Korkyra. Thucydides 
gives an interesting comparison, showing that King Agis of the Spartans “thinking the city was 
not stable” (8.71.1)117 marched to Attika, “hoping that either they [the Athenians] in disarray 
would be more willing to surrender, or that on account of the confusion arising both inside and 
outside he could not fail to capture at least the Long Walls on his first assault because of their 
deserted state” (8.71.1).118 
 This passage mirrors Archidamos’ reasoning earlier in Book 2. Both Spartan kings hoped 
to take advantage of division and uproar in the city and make military gains. However, Agis was 
                                                
115  οἱ τετρακόσιοι µετὰ ξιφιδίου ἀφανοῦς ἕκαστος… ἐπέστησαν τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ κυάµου βουλευταῖς οὖσιν ἐν τῷ 
βουλευτηρίῳ καὶ εἶπον αὐτοῖς ἐξιέναι λαβοῦσι τὸν µισθόν (8.69.4). 
116 καὶ ἄνδρας τέ τινας ἀπέκτειναν οὐ πολλούς…καὶ ἄλλους ἔδησαν, τοὺς δὲ καὶ µετεστήσαντο (8.70.2). 
117 ὁ δὲ νοµίζων τὴν πόλιν οὐχ ἡσυχάζειν (8.71.1). 
118 ἐλπίσας ἢ ταραχθέντας αὐτοὺς µᾶλλον ἂν χειρωθῆναι σφίσιν ᾗ βούλονται ἢ καὶ αὐτοβοεὶ ἂν διὰ τὸν ἔνδοθέν τε 
καὶ ἔξωθεν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γενησόµενον θόρυβον · τῶν γὰρ µακρῶν τειχῶν διὰ τὴν κατ᾽ αὐτὰ ἐρηµίαν λήψεως οὐκ 
ἂν ἁµαρτεῖν (ibid.). 
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even less accurate in his predictions: Thucydides says that there was “not in any way a 
movement within the city” (8.71.2)119, in contrast with the ξυστάσις (dissension) Athens 
experienced after the ravaging of Acharnian territory.  
 The rule of the Four Hundred soon was struck by internal conflicts of its own. Leaders of 
a moderate group of the Four Hundred, Theramenes and Aristokrates, said that “they wanted to 
be rid of so excessively narrow an oligarchy, and that it was necessary instead to designate the 
Five Thousand in reality not in name and put the government on a fairer basis” (8.89.2).120  
However, Thucydides remarks that these arguments were only the “political form of their words” 
(8.89.3)121, and that in reality they were motivated by “φιλοτιµίας” (8.89.3)—the same love of 
honor that motivated the factions at Korkyra. The oligarchs in Athens “did not expect that the 
oligarchy would be stable” (8.89.4).122 Therefore “each man contended to be the first leader of 
the people” (8.89.4)123, certain that the democracy would soon return. This secondary moralizing 
passage in 8.89.3-4 parallels that at 8.66 and 3.82. In 8.66, Thucydides reminds readers of the 
horrors of internal conflict, and in 8.89 he again reveals the true ambitions of factional leaders.  
 This division between radical and moderate oligarchs quickly escalated. The crisis 
culminated in a band of hoplites under Theramenes tearing down the fortifications around the 
Piraeus (8.92). There was no coup however, and the arrival of a Peloponnesian fleet delayed any 
potential negotiations between the Four Hundred and the advocates of the hypothetical Five 
Thousand (8.94). The Athenians launched their ships but were soundly defeated off the coast of 
Eretria, “because the city was in stasis (στασιαζούσης)” (8.95.2).124 
                                                
119  ἔνδοθεν οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν ἐκίνησαν (8.71.2). 
120  οὐ τὸ ἀπαλλαξείειν τοῦ ἄγαν ἐς ὀλίγους ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους ἔργῳ καὶ µὴ ὀνόµατι χρῆναι 
ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἰσαιτέραν καθιστάναι (8.89.2). 
121 ἦν δὲ τοῦτο µὲν σχῆµα πολιτικὸν τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῖς (8.89.3). 
122  οὐκ ἐδόκει µόνιµον τὸ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ἔσεσθαι (8.89.4). 
123 ἠγωνίζετο οὖν εἷς ἕκαστος αὐτὸς πρῶτος προστάτης τοῦ δήµου γενέσθαι (8.89.4). 
124 οἷα πόλεώς τε στασιαζούσης (8.95.2). 
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This is one of the few times Thucydides uses stasis vocabulary to describe the situation in 
Athens. However, in other descriptions of stasis Thucydides omits the term but obviously intends 
a similar meaning. Thus, the entire narrative of the conspiracy of the Four Hundred could be 
considered a stasis125, with a flashpoint arising when a division in the oligarchic ranks brings the 
city to the brink of violence. Using stasis to describe the relative quiet of the coup would have 
diluted the narrative effect of using πόλεώς τε στασιαζούσης in 8.95.2 to describe the new, more 
aggressive confrontation. Thucydides also uses στασιάζω in 8.78, where Peloponnesian soldiers 
are angry with their leader Astyochos for not pressing their advantage against Athens, which is 
crippled by faction. 
After this naval battle, the Athenians “voted to depose the Four Hundred and entrust their 
affairs to the Five Thousand” (8.97.1).126  Those who had “been the most important in the 
oligarchy” (8.98.1)127 immediately fled—another symptom of stasis that Thucydides has 
described earlier. Thucydides firmly declares that “stasis (στάσις) came to an end”(8.98.4)128 
after the new more moderate government was established and the oligarchs fled the city. 
Thucydides also mentions that numerous cities revolted from Athens during this period. 
The most important of these was Samos, where the conspiracy first arose. Thucydides reports 
that Samos “was already making revolution concerning the oligarchy” (8.73.1)129 almost 
immediately after the conspirators established the oligarchy.  
The Samians who had previously been democratic at Peisandros’ instruction attacked 
their enemies for being democratic and established an oligarchy (8.73). When the Samians heard 
                                                
125 As Gomme believes in Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, VIII.78, p.272.  
126 τοὺς τετρακοσίους καταπαύσαντες τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις ἐψηφίσαντο τὰ πράγµατα παραδοῦναι (8.97.1). 
127 ἦσαν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας µάλιστα (8.98.1). 
128 στάσις ἐπαύσατο (8.98.4). 
129 ἐνεωτερίζετο ἤδη τὰ περὶ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν (8.73.1). 
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(exaggerated) rumors of the troubles Athens was experiencing under the Four Hundred, the 
democrats were able to reestablish their power after a brief struggle (8.74-77). 
Other states that revolted or were betrayed with less fanfare were Oropos (8.60.1), 
Abydos (8.61.1), Lampsakos (8.62.1), Thasos (8.64.4), Byzantion (8.80.3), all the cities under 
Pharnabazos and Tissaphernes (8.99.1), Eresos (8.100.3), and Kyzikos (8.107.1). Every one of 
these cities at some point underwent a type of stasis, where an oligarchic or anti-Athenian party 
seized power and causing a revolt from Athens. Thucydides does not go to into detail describing 




 These examples of stasis during the Peloponnesian War reveal a great deal of diversity in 
the circumstances that can cause a stasis. While many of these conflicts are the result of plots, a 
stasis only arises when an army led by an enemy is outside the city walls. Sometimes the surprise 
arrival of an army outside the city triggers a stasis.130 In most cases there is almost no violence 
inside the city, while occasionally a few guards or political enemies are murdered. In general, 
democratic attacks lead to more violence, while oligarchic coups are the result of plots. Usually a 
stasis does not last more than a few days, but the Athenian stasis lasted for months. Usually a 
stasis hinders a city’s ability to project external force, although on some occasions factions put 
their differences behind them to fight an external enemy. 
 These kinds of stasis contrast with ancient pre-Korkyrean staseis, which were rarely the 
result of plots, and earlier staseis involving the Persians, which mostly were the result of Persian 
invasions. The common theme of greed and personal ambition prevails across all stasis 
                                                
130 Puckett, Scott. “Stasis in the Ancient Greek Historians,” p. 177. 
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narratives. Furthermore, in most incidents of stasis, defeated combatants are able to flee or 
escape, as their opponents are content to drive them out, not destroy them completely. Even after 
Korkyra, most defeated factions survive. In fact, many incidents of stasis are nonviolent, 
including many of the cities betrayed to Brasidas. Only on a few occasions does a stasis devolve 
to extreme violence, and this usually occurs when a foreign power is immediately present to 
support one faction and guarantee victory. This divide between non-violent stasis and violent 
stasis suggests that there were two different connotations for the term. Unfortunately, there is no 
clear indicator of what denotes dissension and what signifies civil war. There is no real pattern in 
usage of the noun στάσις (which appears twenty-seven times) or the verb ἐστασίαζε (twenty-one 
times).131 This vagueness reveals a conceptual gap in ancient Greek political thought: there is no 
term available for Thucydides to distinguish between a stasis that only resulted in disagreements 
and a stasis that caused widespread violence. 
 The only examples of stasis where Thucydides mentions considerable internal violence 
are Megara, Argos, and Athens. Only at Argos and Korkyra was the defeated faction pursued and 
destroyed utterly. Argos is the only example of the “out-of-the-way revenge” that Thucydides 
mentions in 3.82. The ploy at Megara to sneak Athenian troops into the city alongside a boat is 
really the only example of a cunning plot; in most other cases conspirators merely sent secret 
messages to their external allies.  
 In 3.82 Thucydides says there was a “revolution in thinking.” The evidence appearing in 
other incidents of stasis supports the notion that attempts to seize power became increasingly 
common; Thucydides describes many incidents of plots to seize power and coups that occurred 
after Korkyra. In reality, these episodes bear closer resemblance to the large stasis at Megara 
                                                
131 Barnard, Mark. “Stasis in Thucydides’ Narrative and Analysis of Factionalism in the Polis.” PhD diss., 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1980, p. 33 
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than to Korkyra, but because the civil war at Korkyra chronologically occurred before Megara, 
Thucydides attributes the origin of later staseis to Korkyra. However, even the numerous 
incidents of stasis that Thucydides records do not justify the claim at 3.82.1 that “virtually all 
Greece was in turmoil.” 
 There is less evidence supporting a revolution in thinking with regard to extraordinary 
retributions. Argos is the only real example of rivals fighting to the death and pursuing their 
enemies after their defeat. However, Thucydides does describe more incidents of extraordinary 
revenge that do not occur during a stasis; the best example of this is the Mytilenean debate, 
where the Athenians were fully prepared to kill and enslave every citizen of Mytilene. The 
Plataean debate provides more evidence; it shows a perverted sense of justice reduced to the 
services rendered towards one side of a conflict. This is clearly a change of morals such as those 
Thucydides describes in 3.82. It is possible that his comments were meant not only to apply to 
internal conflicts, but to Greek society as a whole as well.132 It is not that the Peloponnesian War 
is a fundamentally internal conflict, which is somehow more violent and treacherous than war, 
but rather that stasis is a kind of war that arises within a polis. The observations in 3.82-83 do not 
apply to the Peloponnesian War because it is similar to stasis, they apply to stasis because stasis 
is similar to war. 
 Thucydides has provided paper-thin evidence for his claim in 3.82 that stasis after the 
Korkyrean civil war grew more violent, being aware of earlier events. The stasis at Argos is the 
only real evidence of an “out-of-the-way revenge,” and the stasis at Megara is the only plot to 
seize power that involves any level of cunning. Do these two examples really indicate the trend 
towards worse violence that Thucydides says existed? Perhaps not.  
                                                
132 Macleod, Colin. “Thucydides on Faction (3.82-3).” In Collected Essays of Colin Macleod, edited by Barbara 
Macleod, New York: Clarendon Press, 2005, p. 123. 
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 One of Thucydides’ objectives in recording the history of the Peloponnesian war is to 
describe the immense suffering the war caused (1.23). As such, the few moral authorial 
interjections that he makes, such as at Korkyra or in the plague narrative, support this goal by 
emphasizing suffering and tragedy, and the role of war as a “violent teacher” (3.82.2). His claim 
that incidents of stasis grew more common and violent as the war progressed can be explained as 
a rhetorically effective exaggeration. 
 In his narrative, he provides a bare minimum of evidence to support this claim: only the 
conflict at Argos reached levels even close to Korkyra. However, examining the relative lack of 
evidence from a different perspective yields other possible interpretations. Thucydides may have 
originally not intended to provide any evidence whatsoever in support of his statements in 3.82, 
but felt compelled to include brief episodes that supported his viewpoint because of his own high 
standards for citing evidence. This may not have been the case, but is definitely not impossible. 
 Ultimately, the fact remains that there is a discrepancy between Thucydides’ narrative 
and his authorial commentary. Thucydides has a well-earned reputation for his attention to detail 
and accuracy. In my opinion, making a claim for moral and rhetorical effect does not tarnish this 
reputation. Judgment and analysis of facts differ for every person, and Thucydides clearly held 
beliefs—drawn from his own experience—about stasis during the Peloponnesian War that he 
included even though the other details of his history do not necessarily support him. Thucydides’ 
interjection of his own judgment into his work does not weaken his historiographical authority, 
but makes it more powerful.133 
 
 
                                                
133 I would like to thank everyone who helped me with this project, including my family, Professors Downie and 
Naiden, Professor Bob Connor and everyone else at the Thucydides Gala last fall, and especially my advisor 
Professor Emily Baragwanath.  
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